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IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND THE REFORM OF INVESTMENT LAW 
 
American Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2018) 
 
By Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer* 
 
 
Abstract: This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-
offs associated with alternative institutional processes for resolving investment disputes in terms 
of their relative biases. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under 
the rule of law, which underpins other goals attributed to investment law. The Article makes two 
recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and 
international institutions; second, institutional choice should vary in light of the different contexts 
that States face.  
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The tide is turning. Ferment is in the air. Reform or even transformation of foreign direct 
investment governance appears on the way.1 Different proposals are advanced, different proposals 
trashed. Some defend the current arbitral system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). 
Others support the alternative of a multilateral investment court system. Some focus on market 
mechanisms. Others on national sovereignty. What we lack is a framework for comparatively 
assessing the range of institutional alternatives in light of their relative trade-offs.2 This Article 
provides such a framework. Our central claim is that all institutional alternatives are highly 
imperfect because of the dynamics of participation within them, and thus criticism of one 
institutional alternative without comparatively assessing the imperfections of real-life alternatives 
is of little help and can make for bad public policy. 
To assess trade-offs, one should address two issues in parallel: goal choice and institutional 
choice. Scholars commonly start by specifying the goals of international law.3 Law-and-economics 
scholars focus on efficiency.4 Rawlsian-oriented scholars focus on fairness 5 And realist-oriented 
ones focus on interstate relations, power, and conflict.6 For international investment law, 
commentators conventionally describe these goals as fairness, resource allocation efficiency, and 
peace. They stress the goals in different ways, but they have all been fundamental in contests over 
the construction of the international investment law regime and its institutions over time.7 We 
recast these three goals in light of the broader principle of accountability under the rule of law, 
which underpins (or, we argue, should underpin) these goals. 
Inevitably, observers will disagree over how to specify goals and theorize justice. We argue 
that, whatever one’s preferred goal, different institutional processes will mediate the pursuit of that 
goal in highly imperfect ways. All institutional processes are imperfect, and all of them are 
imperfect in different ways given the dynamics of participation within them. These dynamics result 
in different minoritarian and majoritarian biases. Institutional choice is thus required, and to make 
such choices, one needs to compare institutional processes. 
After applying the comparative institutional analytic framework to a range of market, 
political, and judicial options for resolving investment disputes, we conclude with two 
recommendations. First, policymakers and scholars should pay greater heed to the place of 
institutional complementarity in support of the rule of law in domestic jurisdictions as a central 
consideration of the international investment regime. The argument for complementarity is that, 
                                                 
1 Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 113 AM. J. INT'L L 
[…] (2018). 
2 See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (Our title intentionally borrows from this book.) 
3 See e.g., Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. 
INT'L L 225 (2012) (applying a goal-based approach to assessing the effectiveness of international courts). 
4 See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 532–33 (6th ed. 2003). For its application in 
trade international law, see, Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and 
Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 181 (2002) (“the WTO provisions 
respecting renegotiation and the settlement of disputes over breach of obligations are carefully designed to facilitate 
efficient adjustments to unanticipated circumstances”). 
5 See e.g., AARON JAMES: FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012); THOMAS 
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).  
6 See e.g., STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF 
NATIONS (2015) (focusing first on the “pillar of peace” in terms of the absence of armed conflict); JOSEPH M. GRIECO, 
COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990) (noting that 
realists believe that international cooperation in trade is governed by power).  
7 See Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 465 (2013) (discussing the different goals of investment law). 
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where possible, international processes should be structured not as substitutes but as complements 
to domestic processes to assure government accountability. Second, policymakers and scholars 
should recognize that countries face a range of contexts—in terms of capital endowment, market 
size, ideology, institutional development, and historical legacy—and that these contexts will affect 
their institutional choice. 
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly presents the historical backdrop of 
investment regulation and dispute settlement, from its early roots to the setting of contemporary 
debates over institutional reform. Part II examines three conventional normative goals for 
investment protection: fairness, efficiency, and peace. It then frames them in light of the 
overarching principle of accountability under the rule of law. Part III presents the comparative 
institutional analytic framework with its focus on the dynamics of participation in institutional 
processes so that trade-offs among institutional choices are assessed. Part IV applies the 
framework to evaluate different market, political, and judicial alternatives for handling 
international investment disputes. Part V concludes regarding the choice of options available given 
the different contexts States face. 
 
I.  A NEW DEBATE IN INVESTMENT LAW 
 
Emergence and Evolution of ISDS 
 
Conflict over governmental treatment of property held by foreign nationals has existed for 
centuries, but it intensified in the seventeenth century with the rise of States and mercantilist 
competition among them.8 To resolve conflicts, States turned to some of the methods still used 
today, such as negotiation and mediation, as well as others that are no longer permissible, such as 
armed intervention and the hiring of privateers to collect debts.9 
States submitted foreign investment conflicts to international adjudication as early as 1794, 
when mixed arbitral commissions under the Jay Treaty addressed the settlement of debts to British 
creditors.10 Over time, multiple commissions and ad hoc tribunals were formed. They developed 
international investment law in the shadow of State power and coercion, finding the law’s sources 
in customary international law and general principles of law.11 
After World War II, industrialized countries tried to formalize their views of investment law 
in treaties.12 The United States, for example, promoted treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and 
                                                 
8 See KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013). 
9 See Grover Clark, The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 695-
96 (1933); Yves de la Briere, Evolution De La Doctrine Et De La Pratique En Matiere De Represailles, 22 RECUEIL 
DE COURS 252, 258 (1928). 
10 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. See also, Barton Legum, 
Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794, 95 AM. SOC. INT’L. L. PROC. 202 (2001). 
11 Alan Tzvika Nissel, A History of State Responsibility: The Struggle for International Standards (1870-1960) (2016) 
(unpublished LLD dissertation, Helsinki University); Jason Webb Yackee, The First Investor-State Arbitration: The 
Suez Canal Company v Egypt, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 401 (2016). See also, CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: 
PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985). 
12 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
157, 168–70 (2005) (providing a detailed history of investment agreements and discussing their emergence to the 
threat of uncompensated expropriations of investments). 
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Navigation (“FCN treaties”) with its allies.13 Under some FCN treaties, States could invoke 
interstate dispute settlement (including before the International Court of Justice) by offering 
diplomatic protection after their nationals had exhausted local remedies.14 
During the Post-War years, the United States and Western European countries increasingly 
called for multilateral initiatives that would protect their and their nationals’ property in newly 
decolonized territories.15 Developing countries resisted these attempts by pioneering a 
countervailing effort to create a New International Economic Order that recognized their sovereign 
ownership of their natural resources and championed the exclusive use of domestic law and 
institutions.16 As a result of this clash of perspectives, multilateral treaty-making initiatives 
addressing substantive rights owed to foreign investors—then a highly contested matter—went 
nowhere.17 However, the negotiation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States proceeded, which created a mechanism for the use 
of ad hoc tribunals to enforce investment commitments that might be separately made through 
domestic law, contract, or treaty.18 This convention created the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)—an international organization that is part of the World Bank 
Group.19 
ICSID had a slow start, administering mostly contractual disputes between foreign 
investors and States.20 A more favorable climate towards foreign direct investment developed, 
abetted by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the 
“Washington Consensus” for development policy.21 This conjunction catalyzed the negotiation of 
scores of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) containing ISDS, followed by increased litigation 
under them.22 Through these BITs, investors could bring claims without the need for home State 
                                                 
13 Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 805 (1958); 
John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
302, 308 (2013) (“between 1946 and 1968, the United States negotiated more than twenty [FCN] agreements”). 
14 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United States-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1965. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, April 3, 1961, United States-Vietnam, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. 
No. 4890. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4024.  
15 See e.g., The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 J. OF PUB. L. 115, 119–24 
(1960). 
16 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 
29th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3201(S-VI) (May 1, 1974). See also Burns H. Weston, The Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 437, 439 
(1981). 
17 See e.g. the abandonment of the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (1959), available 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobedeleted/iia/docs/compendium/en/137%20volume%205.pdf. For an earlier effort, 
see The Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners (1929), League of Nations, Document C. 174. M. 53. 1928. 
18 Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1 ICSID REP. 23, 25 (1993). 
19 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 
17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S 192 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  
20 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 224 (2008). 
(describing low intake of mostly contract-based cases); ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 66-67 (2012) 
21 See John Williamson, The Strange History of the Washington Consensus, 27 J. OF POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 195 
(2004).  
22 See e.g., Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Provisions in International 
Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey, (OECD Investment Division, OECD Working Paper on International 
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espousal or (in most cases) the exhaustion of local remedies. Developing countries signed these 
treaties in the hope of attracting investment and to reduce outside political interference,23 but often 
with limited information regarding their implications.24 
A dramatic rise in ISDS cases based on BITs generated a backlash against ISDS, which 
intensified following the 2007 global financial crisis and the filing of politically-charged cases 
implicating developed countries’ public policies.25 The total number of ISDS cases is unknown 
because arbitrations may be kept confidential, but UNCTAD reports that as of July 31, 2017, there 
have been 817 publicly known ISDS cases, with 77 of them being filed in 2015 alone.26 Investors 
from Europe and North America have largely brought these claims, which have involved at least 
114 countries as respondents27. Many scholars and NGOs contended that ISDS developed from 
coercive origins, reflects asymmetric power differentials, and, as a result, is unfair, imbalanced, 
and illegitimate.28 Although other scholars contested these depictions,29 the media often adopted 
this frame, emphasizing ISDS’ undemocratic and highly clandestine nature.30 
                                                 
Investment, No. 2012/2, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/workingpapers.  (estimating that 93% 
of BITs contain language on ISDS, based on a sample of 1,660 treaties). 
23 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, 13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30 (2003) 
(“[T]he willingness to accept internationalized dispute settlement on the part of the host country may well be motivated 
by a desire to show commitment to the creation of a good investment climate.”); Ecuador v. United States, Expert 
Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction of Professor W. Michael Reisman, 14-9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Apr. 4, 2012) 
24 LAUGE SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2015). See e.g. Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Policy Framework Review: Government Position Paper 5 (June 2009), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/ 
files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf (suggesting changes to BITs because “were not in [its] long term interest” 
and “the risks posed by such treaties were not fully appreciated at that time”). 
25 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2008); Mattias Kumm, An Empire of 
Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, 4 ESIL REFLECTION 
3 (2015). For controversial cases, see e.g., Vattenfall AB & Others v. Fed. Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/6, Claimant’s Request for Arbitration (Mar. 30, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Vattenfall_Request_for_ 
Arbitration_001.pdf. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (UNCITRAL 2015) (Jan. 20, 2017) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7303_0.pdf 
26 UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures (UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/7) 
Nov. 7 2017 available http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf. 
27 Id.. 
28 See e.g., DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND 
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 225 (2008) (arguing that the protection offered to foreign investors under international 
investment law “destabilize[s] the functioning of democratic processes, represented by other constitutional rules.”); 
M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (4th ed. 2017); Alliance for Justice, Letter to 
US Congressional Officials and US Trade Representative (Mar. 11, 2015), http://bit.ly/1GKLy5Q (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017). See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (MICHAEL WAIBEL, ET AL. EDS., 2010) 
(identifying some of the systemic concerns, such as limitations on domestic policy space, a lack of democratic 
accountability, a systemic pro-investor bias, and the inability of treaties to respond to changes in economic 
circumstances). 
29 See e.g. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 477 (2009) (defending ISDS  for the capacity to “stabilize” investor 
expectations through the enforcement of rules). 
30 Philip Morris Sues Australia Over Cigarette Packaging, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at B8; Charlie Fidelman, Maker 
of Herbicide Sues Quebec; Dow Agrosciences Says Province Has No Scientific Basis for Ban, MONTREAL GAZETTE, 
April 14, 2009, at A10. James Surowiecki, The Case Against Obama's Trade Agreements, THE NEW YORKER, (June 
22, 2015). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639
 6 
Governments responded to these criticisms and the risk of significant liability from large 
ISDS awards. In the last decade, countries have terminated BITs with ISDS clauses (such as 
Ecuador, Indonesia, and South Africa), withdrew from the ICSID Convention (notably, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela), threatened to leave it (including Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua), 
or created new constraints on using ISDS (such as Norway and New Zealand).31 In response to 
this backlash, multiple reform proposals gradually emerged and many States created new model 
BITs (e.g., Canada and the United States) or approaches (e.g., the European Union).32 
 
Challenges to the Current ISDS Model 
 
For many commentators, the main problem with the current system of international 
investment law enforcement is that it is based on a model of international commercial arbitration. 
It relies on ad hoc tribunals of party-appointed arbitrators to resolve one-off disputes, even though 
the disputes may involve public law and policy.33 The tribunals interpret vague treaty rules—such 
as provisions demanding ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and prohibitions against ‘measures 
tantamount to expropriation.’ The system lacks an appeal process, other than a narrow annulment 
proceeding that has been routinely criticized.34 Conflicting decisions, sometimes involving the 
same facts, raise rule-of-law and coherence concerns.35 Because the arbitrators are appointed on 
an ad hoc basis as opposed to a fixed term and are allowed to represent clients in other arbitrations 
                                                 
31 Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 409, 410 (2010) 
(discussing withdrawals from ICSID by Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela). Ecuador and Venezuela sought to 
renegotiate a number of their investment treaties. See United Nation Conference on Trade & Development, Recent 
Developments in International Investment Agreements (2007–June 2008), 2 IIA Monitor 6 (2008). South Africa 
suspended negotiations of investment treaties. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy 
Framework Review: Government Position Paper 12, 12 (2009), available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf; Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa Pushes Phase-
Out of Early Bilateral Investment Treaties After at Least Two Separate Brushes with Investor-State Arbitration, 
INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Sept. 23, 2012), available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/ 20120924_1. Others have 
impose new restrictions Damon Vis Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-
proposedmodel-bilateral-investment-treaty; ASEAN Australia-New Zealand FTA, ch. 11, art. 27(2). 
32 Roberts, supra note 1 at […]. 
33 Van Harten and Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L. L.  121 (2006); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 92 (2013) (discussing criticism of ISDS proposing a new theoretical framework to 
explain the investment treaty system). 
34 ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 52(1) (limiting annulment review to challenges claiming that the Tribunal 
“manifestly exceeded its powers,” was subject to “corruption,” or “failed to state the reasons” for its decision). On 
criticism of the annulment system, see W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID 
Arbitration, 1988 DUKE L. J. 739, 787 (1989). On inconsistent application of review standards, see Dohyun Kim, The 
Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an 
Annulment-Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 243 (2011). 
35 One can give numerous examples, but just to start, cf. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 
Award, ¶¶ 189–230 (Sept. 5, 2008), with Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 322–45 (May 22, 2007); and Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
(Sept. 3, 2001), with CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Mar. 14, 
2003). Cf. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005), and Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended 
Consequences, APPEALS MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241, 258–59 (Karl Sauvant, ed. 
2008) (suggesting that concerns about inconsistency are overblown). 
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(conduct known as “double hatting”), they face incentives to decide cases in a manner that favors 
the party that appointed them and to assure a flow of future cases, sparking challenges to their 
independence and impartiality.36 Collectively, these individuals constitute a small club of self-
regulated decision-makers that lacks gender and geographic diversity.37 Given the potential for 
large damage awards, the threat of litigation, it is contended, can chill regulation.38 
In response to these critiques, States and commentators have proposed a range of 
institutional reforms that are being discussed in a working group of the United Nations Conference 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).39 Prominently, the European Union (EU) has promoted 
a multilateral investment court system where private investors retain standing to file claims directly 
against States. At its core, this ‘systemic’ change would create a tribunal of first instance and an 
appellate body, with the judges having fixed terms, paid a regular salary, and selected on a random 
basis from a roster designated by States.40 These judges accordingly would be restricted from 
acting as counsel in other cases. The European Union has already concluded agreements 
containing such a system—designed for bilateral relations, but including flexibilities for 
multilateralization—with Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico, and indications that more 
agreements with these features will follow.41 As the world’s largest sender and receiver of foreign 
direct investment and given that around half of all existing BITs involve EU members, the 
European Union exercises considerable leverage in this reform process.42 
In contrast, Brazil and South Africa have proposed alternatives involving mediation, 
possibly backed by State-to-State adjudication in which the State decides whether to espouse an 
investor’s claims.43 In parallel, India adopted a new model BIT that, while it incorporates ISDS, 
                                                 
36 Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration, 
20 J. INT’L ECO. L. 301 (2017) (on double-hating); Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 
661, 672-5 (2017) (explaining different forms of bias in ISDS). 
37 Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, COLUM. FDI PERSPS. NO. 59 
(Feb. 6, 2012), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_59.pdf (at that time, out of 631 appointments in 249 known 
cases, only 41 of appointments were women).  
38 See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in EVOLUTION 
IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (arguing that 
regulatory chill is an important problem “inadequately addressed and often prematurely dismissed by legal scholars”). 
39 Roberts, supra note 1 at […].  
40 European Commission, Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform, Enhancing the Right to Regulate 
and Moving from Current ad hoc Arbitration Towards an Investment Court (May 2015) 11 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF  (“the EU should pursue the creation of one 
permanent court” and offering some details.) 
41 See generally, Colin M. Brown, A Multilateral Mechanism for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Some 
Preliminary Sketches, 32 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 673, 682 (2017) (“The EU is currently engaging on a similar 
basis with all of its negotiating partners (Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, the United States, China, Myanmar, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico etc.)”). See also ‘Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States’ OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, 3; 
Press Release, European Commission, The EU and Vietnam Finalize Landmark Trade Deal (Dec. 2, 
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409; EU, Press Release,  EU and Mexico Reach New 
Agreement on Trade, April 21, 2018 (the agreement … includes the EU's new Investment Court System). 
42 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015. REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE (2015), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf. 
43 Brazil Model Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (2015), available 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4786. For discussion, see, Fabio Morosini & Michelle 
Ratton Sanchez Badin, Reconceptualizing Investment Law from the Global South, in RECONCEPTUALIZING 
INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2017); South 
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conditions its use on the initial pursuit of remedies before domestic courts for at least five years.44 
India and China also have signaled interest in an appellate process, similar to that included in the 
EU’s proposal.45 While the U.S. previously defended ISDS, in October 2017, Robert Lighthizer, 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR), signaled a potential shift in the U.S. position 
regarding ISDS, suggesting that investors should rely on market mechanisms, such as political risk 
insurance.46 In this context, the ICSID Secretariat also has advanced consideration of an 
‘incremental’ updating of the ICSID Regulations and Rules.47 
Much of the debate in the United States and Europe has focused on assessing whether the 
EU’s proposed multilateral investment court system constitutes an improvement or even a 
significant change.48 The EU’s reform proposal and ISDS, however, are just two alternative 
adjudicatory forms. Other adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory options exist, including market-
oriented mechanisms such as insurance and contract. Thus, the broader question arises: What are 
the relative trade-offs among different market, political, and judicial institutional alternatives for 
addressing investment disputes? 
 
II.  NORMATIVE GOALS OF INVESTMENT LAW 
 
To assess institutional options comparatively, we first examine three goals that have been 
advanced to justify the current ISDS model: fairness, resource allocation efficiency, and peace. 
We reconstruct these goals to place them in their best light in terms of justification and fit from a 
perspective of reflective equilibrium.49 As an increasing number of countries are both senders and 
receivers of foreign direct investment, a greater number operate under a veil of ignorance as to 
                                                 
Africa Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015, Dec. 15, 2015 available 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf Art. 13.5 (“The government may consent to [State-to-State] arbitration 
in respect of investments covered by this Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.”). 
44 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016, Art. 15.2 available 
http://mof.gov.in/reports/ModelTextIndia_BIT.pdf (establishing that before seeking international arbitration, 
investors must seek justice before local authorities for at least 5 years).   
45 For India, see, Id. Art. 29. For China, see, Roberts, supra note 1 at […]. 
46 Shawn Donnan, NAFTA: Bitter Differences over Nafta Break into the Open, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/058aa538-b387-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 (“Mr Lighthizer … said the [ISDS] system 
amounted to an unfair subsidy for businesses to invest overseas. ‘Why is it my job to encourage people to invest in 
Mexico?’”). 
47 ICSID, Amendment of ICSID's Rules and Regulations available 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx (“ICSID launched 
the current amendment process in October 2016 and invited Member States to suggest topics that merited 
consideration. In January 2017, ICSID issued a similar invitation to the public inviting suggestions for rule 
amendments.”). Roberts, supra note 1 at […]. 
48 Cf. Stephen Schwebel, The Proposals of the European Commission for Investment Protection and an Investment 
Court System, (May 17, 2016), http://isdsblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/THEPROPOSALSOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.pdf; Charles Brower & 
Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: Why it Need Not, and Must Not, Be 
Repossessed by States, 52 COLUMB. J. OF TRANSNT’L L 689 (2014); and Press Release, U.N. Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement by the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and 
Equitable International Order, (Feb. 4, 2016), 
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17005&LangID=F#sthash.CLxvTf94.dpuf 
(“the investment Court System is but an extension of ISDS, which suffers from many of the same fundamental flaws”) 
49 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 18 (rev ed. 1971, 1999) (on reflective equilibrium); RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE, at 52 (on constructive interpretation).  
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whether they could be claimants or respondents in investment disputes. This trend is conducive to 
an approach that is more balanced in terms of the characterization of investment law goals, which 
we argue has developed over the past decade. We address these goals in three sub-sections in 
which we build our argument from policymaker statements and ISDS jurisprudence as they have 
developed, and (in doing so) we explain why a one-sided view of fairness, efficiency, and peace 
from the perspectives of the investor and investment promotion is flawed (although supported in 
early ISDS jurisprudence and policymaker statements). We then reframe these goals in terms of a 
single, overarching, umbrella principle that we contend encompasses them analytically and is 




A first commonly expressed goal of the ISDS system, as advocated by its defenders, is 
fairness.50 ISDS, it is contended, provides access to justice for aggrieved investors claiming unfair 
treatment.51 From this perspective, ISDS provides a readily available, neutral adjudicatory 
alternative for investors who are unable to obtain justice before national institutions that are 
politically subservient or biased.52 The creation of the ISDS system through ICSID supported this 
aim. ICSID stressed the goal of fairness as a “paramount objective” through which it can make a 
“real contribution . . . in restoring the climate of mutual confidence between States and 
investors.”53 
It is commonly argued, in stylized fashion, that the investor faces what law-and-economics 
scholars refer to as a time inconsistency or “hold-up” problem. In essence, the investor may have 
bargaining power when it makes the investment, but that bargaining power diminishes after it 
invests capital that it cannot easily and quickly withdraw when conditions deteriorate.54 As ISDS 
arbitrator and scholar Michael Reisman writes, “A common feature of foreign direct investment is 
that the investor has sunk substantial capital in the host State… [such that] parity will cease and 
things will tilt heavily in favor of the respondent State. Unless, that is, both sides appreciate that if 
negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration will follow.”55 
Many tribunals, especially earlier in their development of ISDS jurisprudence, focused on 
fairness toward investors. In this vein, the tribunal in the case Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada stated 
that “[t]he aim of NAFTA seems to be… to present to investors the kind of hospitable climate that 
                                                 
50 Fairness generally refers both to fair treatment substantively (such as in terms of a “minimal standard of treatment” 
or “fair and equitable treatment”) and procedurally (such as in terms of access to justice to defend substantive claims), 
recognizing the rights of both investors and treaty parties. Our primary focus is on procedural fairness since this Article 
assesses alternative institutional mechanisms of dispute settlement. Our broader point is that institutional choice 
affects substantive outcomes, including through interpretation, so that procedural and substantive fairness are linked.  
51 See e.g., Robert Volterra, International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility and Investor-State 
Arbitration: Do Investors Have Rights?, 25 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L. J. 218, 220 (2010).  
52 See e.g. JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (2005) (“Whatever the rosy rhetoric about 
the equality of treatment of nationals and foreigners, the very fact of being foreign creates an inequality. The 
foreigner's obvious handicap--his lack of citizenship-is usually compounded by vulnerabilities with respect to many 
types of influence: political, social, cultural.") 
53 ICSID, 1985 Annual Report (1985) p. 4. 
54 Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1063 (2004). 
55 W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID 
REV.—FILJ  185, 190-91 (2009). See also Stephen J. Kobrin, Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing 
Sector in Developing Countries’ 41 INT’L ORG. 609 (1987) (providing some earlier empirical evidence). 
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would insulate them from political risks or incidents of unfair treatment.”56 In the words of the 
Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v United Mexican States tribunal (with former ICJ Judge Greenwood 
presiding), the focus of ISDS is on the “investor . . . seeking to enforce what it asserts are its own 
rights under the treaty.”57 
However, since around the mid-2000s, ISDS decisions increasingly recognize that fairness 
should not be viewed in one-sided terms focusing only on the investor, given that the State has a 
responsibility to balance other welfare goals with the protection of investment.58 Tribunals’ 
development of the principle of a State’s “right to regulate” in light of social welfare goals reflects 
a broader concern of fairness toward other stakeholders.59 Tribunals thus generally “balance” 
investor rights and other claims affecting social welfare.60 When they do so, they implicitly 
recognize that representative governments should take into account the interests of other 
stakeholders as well when they make decisions that can affect investors. This development is 
captured in most contemporary BITs,61 including the preamble of the CETA, which references the 
protection of “investments and investors” with “the right of the Parties to regulate in the public 
interest,” and the 2012 U.S. model BIT, which includes the “objective” of consistency “with the 
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized 
labor rights.”62 
Given the lack of an appellate mechanism in ISDS and the contentiousness of commentary, 
debates continue regarding the conceptualization of fairness. Many contend—and we agree—that 
limiting the concept of fairness to apply only to investors is itself unbalanced and asymmetric, and 
                                                 
56 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, NAFTA, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 at ¶ 116 (Apr. 10, 
2001).  
57 Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on 
Responsibility, ¶ 174 (Jan. 15, 2008). 
58 See Alec Stone Sweet, Michael Chung, and Adam Saltzman, Arbitral Lawmaking and State Power: An Empirical 
Analysis of Investment Arbitration, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, […] 15, (2017) (“As tribunals from Saluka forward 
have made clear, investors cannot expect regulatory arrangements to be frozen”); ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN 
GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 190 
(2017) (“in the vast majority of awards, tribunals made good faith efforts to take seriously the state’s ‘right to 
regulate’”); Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment 
Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1071 (2010) (arguing that tribunals are increasingly engaged in a “balancing 
process” and are “called upon to make value judgments”).  
59 See e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
70 (Apr. 27, 2006) [hereinafter El Paso v. Argentina] (“[A] balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both 
State sovereignty and the State’s responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development 
of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow”); Total S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, paras. 114–34 (Dec. 27, 2010) (States “do not 
thereby relinquish their regulatory powers nor limit their responsibility to amend their legislation in order to adapt it 
to change and the emerging needs and requests of their people”). 
60 See e.g., Waste Management v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3 Award (April 30, 2004) ¶ 110; Chemtura 
Corporation v Government of Canada (UNCITRAL) Award of 2 August 2010, paras 123,134–38 (noting Canada’s 
‘’margin of appreciation”)’ Saluka v. Czech Republic, supra note 60, at ¶ 114; Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, paras. 189 –258, (Sept. 5, 2008) (looking to WTO case law interpreting 
GATT Article XX to balance rights and obligations of States and investors).  
61 See Howse, supra note…, at 29 (58% of BITs negotiated between 2012-2014 contain explicit public policy 
exceptions). 
62 CETA, supra note 47, at Preamble; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Preamble [hereinafter 2012 U.S. 
Model BIT] available at http://www. ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.  
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thus unfair.63 Such asymmetry has raised questions regarding the evenhandedness of ISDS, and 
thus of the international rule of law. Some contend that BITs should be revised to create explicit 
obligations for investors and the right to sue investors for breaching those obligations; indeed some 
new BITs include obligations on investors.64 Yet even if BITs are not so revised, broader interests 
are still encompassed within the State’s right to regulate and balance social welfare goals. 
In our view, focusing on fairness only toward investors builds from a number of flawed 
assumptions and can create a structural tilt against State regulation and the interests of other 
stakeholders represented by the State. First, a one-sided focus is based on assumptions that can 
overstate the relative position of the State in relation to investors, which are often large powerful 
corporations from comparatively rich nations that have many options to protect themselves. Rather 
than being simply law-abiding, risk-taking victims of excessive, opportunistic governments, 
investors may have ‘unclean hands’ and their actions can damage the environment, contribute to 
the violation of human rights, and raise other social concerns. 
Second, a one-sided focus on fairness obscures the fact that investors may be in a much 
stronger position than other stakeholders in relation to the host State through their ability to lobby, 
bargain contractually, obtain insurance, and harness home State diplomacy. In practice, investors 
may procure investments under less than transparent conditions to the prejudice of other 
stakeholders within the State. While it is possible that some governments have the institutional 
capacity to perform a proper balancing of stakeholder interests, the threat of using ISDS can further 
advantage well-resourced foreign investors, creating a structural tilt against State regulation that 
is responsive to the concerns of affected citizens. 
Third, a one-sided view presumes domestic courts cannot be trusted. Yet, if this is the case, 
then domestic stakeholders can be prejudiced as well, but they have no access to a specialized 
forum to sue investors. An asymmetric focus on fairness in the definition and interpretation of 
foreign investment law constrains host governments’ ability to hold powerful, corporate actors 
accountable in situations where the alternative of relying on citizen suits before domestic courts is 
limited or non-existent. Moreover, a traditional ISDS model of substitution could inhibit the 
development of independent, national adjudicatory processes to fairly assess and balance the 




A second goal of ISDS is to promote resource allocation efficiency through reducing the 
State’s cost of capital and thus increasing national welfare and supporting economic development. 
                                                 
63 See e.g., Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 861 (2015).  
64 See Howard Mann et al., IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, Int’l 
Inst. for Sustainable Development (2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_ 
model_int_handbook.pdf (explaining reasons to incorporate investor obligations into investment treaties). For a view 
that BITs already demand some duties to investors, see, Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/21, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Professor Philippe Sands QC, 30 November 2017 (suggesting 
that the company had an obligation of obtain “social license”). For new BITs including obligations of investors, see, 
Reciprocal Investment Promotion And Protection Agreement Between The Government Of The Kingdom Of 
Morocco And The Government Of the Federal Republic Of Nigeria Art. 18 (Dec. 3, 2016) available 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5409 (establishing that investors must uphold the human 
rights and act in accordance with core labour standards). 
65 See infra notes…. [on substitution mechanisms] 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639
 12 
The World Bank stressed this goal in creating ICSID and supporting the ensuing ISDS system. In 
the words of one of the delegates participating in the negotiation of the ICSID Convention: 
“economic development could not be achieved without capital and . . . developing countries would 
not obtain capital unless they provided adequate [legal] guarantees.”66 Law and economics 
scholars highlight this goal. As Alan Sykes writes, “A credible promise of monetary compensation 
to investors, by contrast, in an amount set by neutral arbitrators, goes much further to reduce 
investment risk and to achieve the developing countries’ goal of lowering the foreign cost of 
capital.”67  
For a rational foreign investor, its choice to invest is a function of the margin of profit 
needed in light of the risk of investing. The investor’s decision is a question of opportunity costs; 
the greater the risk, the more profit it will require if it is to invest in a location. The cost of capital 
for investors implicates a State’s cost of capital directly and indirectly. States depend on 
investment, whether public or private, and whether foreign or domestic. Capital inflows into States 
can take different forms—through loans, bonds, and foreign direct investment. Directly, higher 
investment risk increases the State’s borrowing costs because lenders and bond holders demand 
higher interest rates. Indirectly, higher risk premiums for foreign investors correlate with higher 
borrowing costs for States.68 Overall, the risks associated with investing in a State affect the State’s 
cost of capital for investment and thus resource allocation efficiency.  
From the perspective of efficiency, the titles and preambles of many BITs reflect the goal 
of efficiency in terms of promoting private investment.69 Accordingly, some investment tribunals 
have focused on investment promotion in interpreting BIT provisions.70 In doing so, they can 
develop jurisprudential standards that appear to create a bias against any new regulation that may 
prejudice an investor. The Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico, for example, maintained that the investor 
must “know beforehand any and all rules and regulation that will govern its investments, as well 
as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives.”71 This controversial 
                                                 
66 A. BROCHES, GEN. COUNS., NOTE TRANSMITTED TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PARTIES (1961), REPRINTED IN INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
DISP., 2 THE HISTORY OF THE SID CONVENTION: PART 1 AT 244 (1968). See also, Report of the Executive Directors 
supra note 24 at para. 9 (1965) (ICSID was “designed … [as] a major step toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence and thus stimulating a larger flow of private international investment into territories, which is the primary 
purpose of the Convention”). 
67 Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 631, 643 (2005). 
68 See Jeswald Salacuse, Of Handcuffs and Signals: Investment Treaties and Capital Flows to Developing Countries, 
58:1 Harv. Intl L.J. (2017). 
69 Id., at 130-131 (citing BIT preambles and titles). See e.g., 2008 German Model Treaty Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf at Preamble [hereinafter 2008 German Model BIT] 
(“recognizing that the encouragement and contractual protection of such investments are apt to stimulate private 
business initiative and to increase the prosperity of both nations”).  
70 See e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID REP. 518 (2005) (the Tribunal found it “legitimate to resolve 
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favor the protection of covered investments” because BITs intend to “create 
and maintain favorable conditions for investments”); [Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, ¶¶ 173; 183 
(London Ct. Int’l Arb. July 1, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/. (“The stability of the legal and business 
framework is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”).] 
71 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶154 (May 29, 2003), 43 ILM 
133 (2004) [hereinafter Tecmed Award]. 
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and expansive phrasing of the standard suggests that regulation should be frozen and not developed 
in light of experience and democratic choice. 
Yet, the dominant trend of investment tribunals is to balance investor protection with a 
State’s right to regulate when deciding on investment claims, such as claims regarding alleged 
unfair treatment or indirect expropriation. This approach implicitly conceptualizes resource 
allocation efficiency from a broader social welfare perspective.72 That is, from a law-and-
economics perspective, resource allocation efficiency involves the optimality of investment 
protection, and not investment promotion per se. Otherwise, ISDS will have an anti-regulatory 
bent since the best way to attract investment would be to limit government regulation. Absolute 
investment protection is not optimal, and thus not efficient, because it precludes the balancing of 
other social welfare goals. Indeed, Anthea Roberts rightly points out that jurisprudence that focuses 
solely on investor protection could trigger State exit from the investment regime, “undermining 
investor protection and the promotion of efficient investments in the long term.”73 
Whether ISDS actually catalyzes investment is forcefully debated, as is the broader 
question whether increased foreign investment is even desirable as a development strategy.74 As 
Robert Howse writes, the argument that BITs support development through incentivizing foreign 
investment is based on three premises: (i) that additional investment boosts economic growth and 
development; (ii) that treaty protection will incentivize additional investment; and (iii) that treaty 
protection is cost-effective compared to other State incentives for foreign investment.75 All of these 
premises are contested, both empirically and in terms of economic theory.76 
The goal of resource allocation efficiency is an important one affecting aggregate national 
welfare and the prospects of economic growth and development. Yet, from a law-and-economics 
perspective, the goal of resource allocation efficiency should be framed in terms of optimal 




                                                 
72 See supra notes… On the logic espoused in these cases; see, e.g., Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Treaty Law and 
the Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and Solutions, 78 MODERN L. REV. 793, 811 (2015) (“the logic 
that investment should be protected, not for the sake of individual economic interests but for the purpose of 
contributing to enhancing social welfare”). 
73 Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 
380 (2015). 
74 For a literature review, see Christian Bellak, How Bilateral Investment Treaties Impact on Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Meta-Analysis of Public Policy (2013), available at 
http://www2.gre.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/822705/Christian-Bellak-How-BilateralInvestment-Treaties-
Impact-on-Foreign-Direct-Investment-A-Meta-analysis-of-Public-Policy.pdf (“In a nutshell, the positive impact of 
BITs on FDI has not been confirmed empirically”). 
75 Robert Howse, International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework, (Forthcoming in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION (Helene Ruiz-Fabri, ed.,) available https://www.iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Howse_IILJ_2017_1-MegaReg.pdf p 14. 
76 Id. Foreign investment law differs from trade law in that it is not grounded in a widely accepted economic theory, 
such as the theory of comparative advantage for trade. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference 
Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 7 (distinguishing the case for free trade and 
for liberal capital flows); see also THOMAS PIKETTY, LE CAPITAL AU XXI SIECLE 120-21 (2013) (dismissing the idea 
that countries that have seen rapid growth and development especially in Asia received massive FDI). 
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A third normative goal of investment dispute settlement is to reduce interstate conflict and 
thus support peaceful and cooperative international relations.77 From this perspective, the 
adjudication of disputes involving foreign investors helps ensure that investment disputes are 
resolved by law instead of force or other forms of coercion. Otherwise, investment disputes could 
trigger costly diplomatic confrontations between the host State and the investor’s home State that 
could escalate and possibly undermine cooperation in other areas. 
This goal was central to the World Bank’s promotion of the ICSID regime. Ibrahim Shihata 
stressed the goal—perhaps opportunistically—at a time when the volume of foreign direct 
investment in developing countries was declining as a consequence of debt crises.78 According to 
Shihata, ISDS was superior because it effectively encourages investment “without inviting the 
abuses of diplomatic protection” of the past.79 This framing particularly resonated among Latin 
American countries that had suffered reprisals by the United States and European powers in the 
form of “gunboat diplomacy”80 to protect their nationals—actions that generated resistance among 
Latin American nations to join a system for the international adjudication of investment disputes.81 
Because the home States of investors historically used coercive methods to resolve 
investment disputes, some scholars defend ISDS by recalling the past. For example, Judge 
Schwebel stresses that “the displacement of gunboat diplomacy by international arbitration is a 
very real achievement.”82 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, a U.S. negotiator of the ICSID 
Convention, writes in a NAFTA case that “the essential feature of investor-state arbitration, as it 
has developed since the ICSID Convention of 1965, . . . is that controversies between foreign 
investors and host states are insulated from political and diplomatic relations between states.”83 
This goal has a long pedigree and links with what is arguably the foremost goal of public 
international law: to ensure international peace.84 Assessing whether this historical depiction 
overstates the past use of coercive methods or, rather, understates the coercive methods used today, 
                                                 
77 See 2 CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER 
STATES: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION, pt. 1, at 303 (1968) 
(explaining that the ICSID Convention would “serve … the cause of international co-operation generally” and that 
the Convention was better than the existing situation of diplomatic protection “which would transform the controversy 
into a dispute between States”). For a discussion on different understandings of the de-politicization goal, see Roberts, 
Triangular Treaties, supra note 73 at 388-95. 
78 ICSID, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1984) (statement of Ibrahim Shihata arguing that “in an era in which it has become 
increasingly difficult for a developing country to obtain official development assistance and in which foreign private 
investment has in recent years diminished markedly, ICSID membership cannot be but a positive element in a 
developing country's policies.").  
79 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and 
MIGA, 1 ICSID Rev.–Foreign Inv. L.J. 1, 25 (1986). 
80 SIR JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919–1979: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE 39 
(1981). 
81 In 1964, at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank in Tokyo Latin-American countries 
voted together against the ICSID Convention. For a detailed discussion the negative attitude toward the Convention 
in Latin America, see Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 256 
(1971). 
82 Stephen M. Schwebel, Keynote Address: In Defence of Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 2 available 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/2/14169776244680/schwebel_in_defence_of_bits.pdf. 
83 Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility (Jan. 15, 2008), 
Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Lowenfeld, para 1. 
84 See Ratner, supra note…; Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279, 
(2018).  
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is beyond this Article’s scope. We nonetheless note that self-help through the use of force to 
recover debts is now prohibited under international law, so that arguments regarding the goal of 
peace arise in a very different context.85 In part because of this change, many question the 
continued usefulness of discussing “depoliticization” in the contemporary context. Martins 
Paparinskis, for example, contends that it has weak empirical foundations and “has no self-evident 
use for conceptualizing and resolving modern challenges.”86 Even with ISDS, he argues, “the 
dispute retains the same degree of political sensitivity.”87  
We add to the debate that the conventional conception of ISDS in terms of depoliticization, 
once more, has had a rather one-sided, pro-investor focus—it promotes ISDS to advance this end. 
We contend that the goal of international cooperation between States is indeed an important one, 
but that it should be viewed equally in terms of reducing constraints on States’ ability to adapt 
regulation to changing contexts in light of experience and new information, including in relation 
to global and transnational initiatives—think, for example, of the policies behind the “tobacco 
carve-out” from using ISDS under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.88  
Accordingly, we focus on the relative impact of institutional design on the furtherance of 
the goal of international cooperation and peace. Although international disputes can become 
politicized under any system, the level of politicization can vary in light of institutional design. In 
international trade law, for example, the U.S. administration currently threatens to undermine the 
dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) by blocking the appointment 
of members to the WTO Appellate Body.89 Commentators worry about the long-term 
consequences for trade relations if this dispute settlement system erodes. For the investment law 
world, this development raises concern if ISDS were replaced by a court built on the WTO 
Appellate Body model. The goals of cooperative and peaceful interstate relations, in other words, 
continue to raise issues of institutional choice.  
 
Reframing the Goals: Protection of the Rule-of-Law 
 
We contend that the three conventional goals of investment protection reflected in ISDS—
fairness, efficiency, and peace are linked both analytically and consequentially to a broader 
                                                 
85 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
86 See Martins Paparinskis, Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, in 3 SELECT 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271–82 (James Crawford ed., 2010) (discussing 
the concept of diplomatic protection and depoliticisation).   
87 Id., at 273. See also, Geoffrey Gertz, Srividya Jandhyala, and Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Legalization, diplomacy, 
and development: Do investment treaties de-politicize investment disputes?, 107 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 239, 240 
(2018) (noting ongoing pressure on top developing country officies to resolve disputes); and JONATHAN BONNITCHA, 
LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY 
REGIME (2017) chs. 7 and 8. 
88 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement permitted treaty parties to “block corporations from using the [ISDS] 
mechanism to receive compensation for commercial damages resulting from tobacco control measures”—an example 
being those promoted transnationally by the World Health Organization. See Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer, A 
Breakthrough with the TPP: The Tobacco Carve-Out, 16:2 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY, L. & ETHICS (2016).  
89 Jennifer A. Hillman, Independence at the Top of the Triangle: Best Resolution of the Judicial Trilemma? 111 AM. 
J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 364-368 (2017); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 225, 225-6 (2017). 
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principle—accountability under the rule of law. In the words of ICJ Judge James Crawford, one 
of the main roles “of international law is to reinforce, and on occasions to institute, the rule of law 
internally.”90 In our view, the rule of law provides the guiding principle for international 
investment law. The concept resonates with traditional justifications for investment law, such as 
the obligation not to “deny justice,”91 contemporary arbitral jurisprudence regarding the 
“minimum standard of treatment” and “fair and equitable treatment,”92 and the preamble and other 
provisions of treaties such as CETA and those based on the 2012 U.S. model BIT.93 
The meaning of the “rule-of-law” is, however, contested.94 Many legal philosophers focus 
on abstract formal conceptions of the rule of law, such as the law’s generality, equality of 
application, and certainty. Lon Fuller notably advanced eight elements that constitute conditions 
for the rule of law—law should be “general, publicized, prospective, clear, non-contradictory, 
compliable, consistently applied, and reasonably stable.”95 Joseph Raz specified similar principles 
and divided them into two groups, the first focused on formal standards that provide certainty and 
predictability to guide action, and the second focused on legal machinery to make the first 
effective.96 These formal concepts of the rule of law highlight the coordinative function of norms 
                                                 
90 James Crawford, International Law and the Rule of Law, 24 ADELAIDE L. REV. 3 (2003). 
91 See e.g., Edwin Borchard, The Minimum Standard of the Treatment of Aliens, 1939 PROCEEDINGS, AM. SOC. INT. 
LAW 51-63 (stating “[f]air courts, readily open to aliens, administering justice honestly, impartially, without bias or 
political control, seem essentials of international due process.”); Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) 
(U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1109 at para. 128 (citing Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 
I.C.J. 266, 284) (a case based on a FCN treaty: "arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as 
something opposed to the rule of law. . .It is a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least 
surprises, a sense of juridical propriety”). See also, Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 
¶ 178 (Oct. 12, 2005), http://tinyurl.com/4k8pr35 (finding against the complainant because: “Such proceedings are 
provided for in all legal systems and for much the same reasons. One therefore cannot say that they were ‘opposed to 
the rule of law.’ … Arbitrariness is therefore excluded”); Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 269 (Aug. 27, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/3duq8wh;   
92 See e.g., Waste Management, supra note …, at ¶ 98 (the minimum standard of treatment is “infringed by conduct 
attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, 
is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading 
to an outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in 
judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candor in an administrative process”). See also, Alain 
Pellet, Police Power and the State’s Right to Regulate, in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW - THE FIRST 
50 YEARS OF ICSID, (Kinnear et al. eds. 2016). 
93 See e.g., CETA, supra note 47, at Preamble. (“[Recognising] the importance of … the rule of law for the 
development of international trade and economic cooperation”). Newer versions of BITs provide that “‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory 
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.” 
See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty supra note 62 at Art. 5(2)(a). 
94 Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law An Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 138-44 
(2002); Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and The Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan 
C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987). 
95 See Charles Sampford, Reconceiving the rule of law for a globalizing world, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 9, 14 (Spencer Zifcak ed., 2005). Sampford builds from Fuller’s list of eight ways in which a legal system can 
fail. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Rev. Ed. 1969). Fuller defends, in his words, a “procedural version 
of natural law.” Id. at 96-97. 
96 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY, 214-19 (1979) (listing eight 
principles). 
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by providing a framework against which individuals and organizations might orient action, 
interact, and plan.97 
The rule of law becomes more contested when it includes substantive norms and goals, 
representing political choices, such as a democratic form of government, participation, 
deliberation, and individual rights. Leading philosophers and social theorists, such as Ronald 
Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, Jurgen Habermas, and Philip Selznick, advance different substantive 
conceptions to attend to broader values realized through law.98 In different ways, United Nations 
reports on the rule of law incorporate substantive conceptions,99 as do reports of the Bretton Woods 
institutions supporting market-oriented development policies.100 
The rule of law, in our view, is best conceptualized from a socio-legal perspective that 
focuses on goals and practices. The goal of the rule of law is to create restraints on government in 
order to provide security and predictability so that individuals and firms can plan their pursuits and 
do so without fear.101 Its basic conception is opposition to the arbitrary exercise of power. 
Ultimately, for the rule of law to become effective, it must be institutionalized as part of a culture 
of appropriate conduct.102 From a socio-legal perspective, the rule of law provides restraints on 
arbitrary State behavior, backed by norms that enable people to reasonably know what is required 
of them, combined with the institutionalization of these norms so that they “count as a source of 
restraint and a normative resource” that may be used in practice.103 Applied to investment law, the 
rule of law provides foreign investors with the security and predictability that State commitments 
                                                 
97 Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2008) (“Law in the first sense requires 
the existence of certain general norms that serve as a basis of orientation for people’s behavior, as well as a basis for 
decision by the courts.”). 
98 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 259 (1985) (proposing the ideal of rule as a public conception of 
individual rights); Waldron, supra note 101, at 1 (favoring a “procedural and argumentative conception of the Rule of 
Law”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 453 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (legitimacy as “procedural rationality”); P. SELZNICK WITH P. NONET 
AND H.M. VOLLMER, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 253 (1969) (“Procedure cannot be ‘due’ if it does not 
conform to the canons of rational discourse”). 
99 See e.g. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 
para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (rule of law as a “principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards”). 
100 See Erik Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns 
and Reformers’ Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW (Eric 
Jensen & Thomas Heller eds., 2003); Kathryn Hendley, The Rule of Law and Economic Development in a Global Era, 
in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sara ed., 2004); and Patrick McAuslan, Law, 
Governance and the Development of the Market: Practical Problems and Possible Solutions, in GOOD GOVERNMENT 
AND LAW: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25, 42 (Julio Faundez ed., 1997) (“[In] 
World Bank publications… the rule of law… is being redefined to emphasize its role in facilitating the enforcement 
of private contracts so that law reform to advance the rule of law is the same as law reform to advance the market 
economy”). 
101 Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 45, 60 
(Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009). 
102 Id., at 58-60. Tamanaha thus defines the rule of law to mean that “government officials and citizens are bound by 
and abide by the law.” Brian Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, SINGAPORE J. OF L. STUDIES 
232, 233 (2012). 
103 Id. See also BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 141 (2004); PHILIPPE NONET 
& PHILIP SELZNICK, TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 53 (“[T]he rule of law is better understood as a distinctive institutional 
system than as an abstract ideal”). 
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to them will be upheld. It creates, in the words of investment tribunals, “legitimate expectations” 
on the part of investors, subject to the State’s “right to regulate” to advance social welfare.104 To 
the extent one views the rule of law as also involving processes of participation and deliberation 
of the governed regarding the institutions that govern them, then that has implications for 
investment dispute settlement as well, highlighting the role of domestic institutions that are closer 
to the governed, with international mechanisms serving as complements to them, as addressed 
below.105 
We contend that the socio-legal framing of the rule of law is linked with our 
conceptualization of the three goals of investment law discussed above both analytically and 
conceptually.106 First, the rule of law principle can be viewed analytically as incorporating the 
concept of procedural fairness in terms of law’s inner morality (in Fuller’s sense when viewed in 
terms of actual practice).107 John Rawls, for example, defines the rule of law as “the regular, 
impartial, and in this sense fair, administration of law.”108 Notably, the concept of fairness under 
the rule of law is symmetric for all stakeholders, and thus does not privilege foreign investors; for 
other stakeholders in the investment process, for example, the rule of law helps ensure that 
government officials do not engage in corrupt transactions or otherwise favor foreign investors 
over other interests.109 Viewed consequentially, there is good reason to believe that the rule of law 
contributes to fairness, as the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson stressed in the conclusion of his 
magisterial study of English enclosure laws.110 
Second, the rule of law principle can be viewed analytically as incorporating the concept 
of resource allocation efficiency when law is viewed in terms of “planning” that helps to coordinate 
behavior—as in Scott Shapiro’s work.111 Those who stress efficiency as a goal, however, are 
generally consequentialists. From a consequentialist perspective, the rule of law contributes to 
resource allocation efficiency and thus economic development by increasing transparency, 
preventing corruption, and reducing political risk.112 Once again, it does not do so from a one-
sided focus on investment promotion, but rather from a broader social welfare perspective. Indeed, 
some empirical evidence shows that, in most contexts, decreased risk in a country’s political and 
legal system—including indicators for law and order—correlates with higher levels of 
investment.113  
                                                 
104 Krygier, supra note 101, at 60. 
105 See infra notes… [on international mechanisms as complements].  
106 See also Howse, supra note…, at 34 (noting three rule of law rationales that can be read as linked to efficiency (to 
address the hold-out problem), fairness (to improve the rule of law), and peace (depoliticization). 
107 See Fuller, supra note…. 
108 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note…, at 235. 
109 See Garcia et al, supra note 66 at 871 (“even if ISDS strengthens the rule of law for one class of stakeholders 
(investors), this is no substitute for the larger systemic evaluation of ISDS in terms of the rule of law for all 
stakeholders, not just favored investors.”). See e.g., Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/26, Award (27 Dec. 2016) (The tribunal ruled that one purpose of the investment system is to promote 
the rule of law, which precluded offering protection to investor that engaged in unlawful activities). For an example 
of the treatment of corruption in an ISDS case, see World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7, ¶ 120 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). 
110 E.P. THOMPSON, OF WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-269 (1975). 
111 See e.g., SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (providing “a planning theory of law” that conceptualizes “legal 
systems” as “institutions of social planning”). 
112 See e.g. DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
113 Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study (1997); Kyeonghi Baek & 
Xingwan Qian, An Analysis on Political Risks and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and 
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Third, the rule of law links analytically with the concept of peace by stressing the use of 
law to resolve conflicts in lieu of power. To turn to a consequentialist perspective, the rule of law 
can reduce international conflict that otherwise arises when State authorities seize foreign investor 
property or otherwise deny foreign investors justice. Democratic peace theory provides evidence 
that democracies grounded in the rule of law are less likely to go to war against each other.114 Once 
more, the rule of law principle does not have a one-sided focus on investors—i.e. focusing on a 
private right of standing to depoliticize investment disputes—but rather one that encompasses all 
stakeholders in the investment process.  
From a socio-legal perspective, the ultimate challenge for the rule of law is its 
implementation in practice, which will be mediated by social institutions. Because law is 
frequently ambiguous, often involving the interplay of standards, rules, and exceptions, the 
application of the rule of law will always be contested.115 No legal process is “discretion-free” 
because law’s meaning is mediated through the operation of legal and non-legal institutions and 
interactions involving people. Thus, any meaningful understanding of the rule of law must be 
based on cultures of practice embedded in institutions.  
One of the disconnects in the field of ISDS is that proponents focus on the need for 
investment arbitration because of challenges with the domestic rule of law, while opponents focus 
on the failure of ISDS to adhere to rule-of-law standards. Yet, both of these mechanisms are subject 
to severe imperfections. Thus, any meaningful choice between them from a rule-of-law perspective 
must engage with a comparison of their trade-offs, along with those of other institutional 
alternatives. This calls for comparative institutional analysis. 
 
III.  THE FRAMEWORK: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
We contend that our construction of the goals of investment law place them in their best 
light in terms of justification and fit. Yet, we recognize that the framing of investment law’s goals 
is contentious so that we may not convince all readers. Thus, we insist on a broader point in this 
Article—the need for comparative analysis—even if one disagrees with our construction of 
international investment law’s goals. However one frames the goals of investment law, those goals 
must be pursued through institutional mechanisms involving interested actors and different 
decision-making processes.116 Thus, goal choice must be complemented by institutional analysis, 
whatever the goal may be. For institutional analysis, the key question is: compared to what? Neil 
Komesar powerfully developed comparative institutional analysis and applied it to U.S. domestic 
                                                 
Industrialized Economies, ECON. MGMT. & FIN. MARKETS, 60, 64 (2011). Cf. Jason Webb Yackee, Political Risk and 
Foreign Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477 (2014) (noting the limits of political risk theories). 
114 See e.g. MICHAEL DOYLE, LIBERAL PEACE: SELECTED ESSAYS 4 (2012) (referring to States “founded on such 
individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberty, private property, and elected 
representation” and notably “freedom from arbitrary authority”). For a precursor, see IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL 
PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795). 
115 See e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
116 See Komesar, supra note 2 at 24. 
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law.117 Other scholars have applied the framework to European Union law and WTO law, but, to 
our knowledge, not explicitly to international investment law.118 We do so here. 
In critiquing or advocating a particular institutional choice, one should not focus on the 
defects of a single institution while failing to apply the same rigor to its alternatives. Institutions 
should rather be assessed from a comparative perspective, one that avoids ideal characterizations 
in favor of analysis that takes account of real-life institutional pathologies. Just as Ronald Coase 
labeled economic analyses that compare an existing institution (say the legislative process) with 
an “ideal” alternative (say the market) as “blackboard economics,”119 much international legal 
scholarship similarly fails to compare institutional alternatives, especially legal processes, that take 
account of their real-world complexity. 
A more realistic assessment of the possible approaches for resolving investment disputes 
should take account of three central points: first, that the pursuit of any normative goal is mediated 
by social decision-making processes; second, that these decision-making processes are biased in 
different ways because of the dynamics of participation within them; and third, that any meaningful 
public policy analysis must involve comparative institutional analysis of real-world (rather than 
ideal) alternatives. The key is to assess institutional alternatives comparatively. To do so, one looks 
at such factors as numbers, complexity, and per capita stakes that shape the dynamics of 
participation. One then assesses the implications of these dynamics on different forms of bias in 
institutional decision-making. 
 
Participation: Numbers, Complexity, and Per Capita Stakes 
 
A focus on participation in institutional decision-making processes should address both the 
benefits and costs of participation. Understanding the role of numbers, complexity, and per capita 
stakes is critical for this analysis. Where there are large numbers of affected individuals who have 
low per capita stakes, serious collective action problems arise. The benefits may be large in 
aggregate, but they are not large enough for individuals to attend closely to complex issues. 
Applied to international investment law, this analysis suggests that individuals are unlikely to 
organize in opposition to expansive investor protections or ISDS, whether based on an investment 
contract, a national law, or an international treaty. In contrast, investors have high per capita stakes 
in investment projects, which creates the incentive for them to assess benefits and costs. Investors 
thus may deploy significant resources to shape investment law norms and their application. They 
are, in sum, well-positioned to lobby for investment protection ex ante and to litigate for favorable 
interpretations and compensation ex post.120 
                                                 
117 Komesar, supra note 2. See also, NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2002). 
118 For E.U. law, see MIGUEL MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998); For WTO law, see Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and 
Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (2011). See also, Howse, supra note 77 at 32 (a powerful piece 
on investment law in a comparative vein, though it does not explicitly engage with this framework). 
119 RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 28 (1988). 
120 One may also see cycles of lawmaking. After the law initially favors some groups (such as foreign investors), other 
groups organize (such as through non-governmental organizations). Where foreign investors challenge politically 
important regulation in rich countries, these groups can help mobilize civil society. They thereby can exercise greater 
influence on reform processes, as has occurred in Europe regarding foreign investment law treaties. 
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The organization of interests in relation to institutional decision-making has ex ante and ex 
post dimensions—involving dynamics of participation before and after a dispute arises. The 
investing firm often has much better information regarding environmental and social risks at stake 
from a prospective investment, but it may not disclose them. After harms become evident, 
organizing becomes less demanding for affected communities. This dynamic particularly occurs 
with local decision-making, where numbers are smaller and so it is easier for individuals to 
overcome collective action problems when harms become salient. 
Organized groups—what Komesar calls “catalytic sub-groups”—may have interests in 
common with the local majority and spur their increased participation. These groups can publicize 
harms and rally residents to oppose investment projects and place pressure on government 
officials.121 Today, the development of social media can assist their mobilization efforts. 
International investment dispute settlement thus has analogues with local government decisions 
since disputes can pit outsider investors against a local community. This local ‘majority’ may, in 
turn, not take account of the broader social and development concerns of the province or nation, 
much less the costs imposed on a foreign investor with high sunk costs.122 Seen from this 
perspective, it is not surprising that a number of ISDS cases involve municipalities denying or 
cancelling permits to operate locally.123 
 
Decision-making: Minoritarian and Majoritarian Bias 
 
Institutional decision-making inevitably involves the push and pull of different forces in 
light of the dynamics of participation. These forces give rise to different forms of minoritarian and 
majoritarian bias.124 Minoritarian bias appears when well-organized, discrete interests shape 
policy. In investment law, this could involve a foreign investor colluding with a domestic 
government official or, alternatively, a domestic business seeking an advantage over a foreign 
investor. Majoritarian bias, in contrast, appears when the many oppress the few, imposing higher 
costs on them.  
Assessing these different forms of bias requires a benchmark, which we view in terms of 
weighing the welfare of all stakeholders equally. While some law-and-economics scholars see the 
benchmark objectively in terms of resource allocation efficiency, an external, objective assessment 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, when goals are incommensurate, as they invariably are with 
public policy. Our focus thus centers on participation in social decision-making processes. From 
a law-and economics perspective, participation and social welfare are closely related since, as 
                                                 
121 Komesar, supra note 2 at 84. 
122 Id. at 79 (“Land use decisions by small jurisdictions are classic examples of instances in which large numbers with 
lower per capita impacts [residents of developed parcels] can dominate small numbers with higher per capita stakes 
[residential developers or owners of undeveloped land]”). 
123 See e.g., Metalclad v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000) (concerning the denial of 
construction permit and designation of an ecological zone); Tecmed supra note 74 (concerning a denial of permit for 
landfill in a rapidly growing municipality); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 5-25 (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), 48 I.L.M. 1038 (concerning a denial of mining permit in response to pressure from a 
local indigenous community). For an excellent discussion of regulatory takings cases, see Steven R. Ratner, 
Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 
475 (2008). 
124 Komesar calls this a two-force model of politics. Komesar, supra note 2 at 65-89. 
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Komesar writes, “participation is the heart of key economics concepts such as transaction costs, 
externalities and resource allocation efficiency.”125  
These different forms of bias in participation in social decision-making processses have 
distinct dynamics and impacts in the investment law context. For example, minoritarian bias 
favoring foreign investors may adversely affect domestic stakeholder interests because of adverse 
environmental and social impacts and other externalities. In contrast, majoritarian bias may 
adversely affect foreign investors but have different short- and long-term effects on domestic 
stakeholders. In the short term, domestic politics might favor reneging on a contractual obligation 
or triggering an expropriation when a country is faced with large budget deficits or immediate 
resource needs.126 However, these actions could have long-term adverse effects on a country’s 
ability to attract capital. 
Schools of scholarship often reflect particular ideological predispositions and accordingly 
tend to focus on biases in particular institutions. For example, public choice approaches focus on 
minoritarian bias in political processes, assessing the power of the few to shape decision-making, 
resulting in discrimination and regulatory capture.127 Scholars working in this vein often favor the 
use of market processes to avoid these biases (think, for instance, of much of the scholarship in 
international trade law). A comparative institutional analysis reveals, however, that market 
processes also may be skewed because most affected actors are dormant, disorganized, 
uninformed, or misled. Indeed, were markets to function effectively, competition for investment 
capital could discipline governmental decision-makers, obviating the need for international 
investment law in the first instance. 
Rights claims can trigger judicial intervention against regulatory decision-making to 
protect minoritarian interests against majorities. Such intervention may involve a single investor 
with high per capita stakes on one side and large groups with low per capita stakes on the other. 
Where they overcome collective action problems, these groups can press officials to impose high 
costs on sunk investments through ex post regulations or expansive interpretations of existing ones. 
Investors may have been in a powerful position in drafting contracts and lobbying for regulations 
ex ante because of their higher per capita stakes compared to the general public, which faced 
significant information and organizational costs regarding a proposed project. The project’s 
opponents, however, can become more powerful ex post after the investment was made and its 
ensuing costs became apparent. 
Judicial processes can help correct for majoritarian biases by offering the advantage of 
evenhandedness and legal reasoning—hallmarks of the rule of law. Yet, courts too are subject to 
limitations and other biases. Judicial processes are expensive to use on a case-by-case basis, thus 
favoring parties with financial means and high per capita stakes. Judicial processes may thus favor 
investors who hire sophisticated lawyers to shape the interpretation of open-ended provisions and 
                                                 
125 Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, Participation and Institutional Choice (Two Ways), in 
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165, 170 (Sandra S. Batie & 
Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2008) 
126 The two most common ISDS claims are violations of “fair and equitable treatment” (including specific 
commitments made to investors that creates “justified expectations”) and expropriations (particularly indirect 
expropriations, as in the Argentine cases, but also direct ones, as in the Venezuela cases). See Stone Sweet et al, supra 
note 63. 
127 See e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MAN. SCI. 3 (1971); JAMES 
M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (1962). 
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create favorable legal doctrines over time. In this way, the “haves” may come out ahead in 
adjudication.128 Judicial processes, moreover, have limited resources to handle the range of social 
conflicts. In short, they involve high access costs and limits of scale given the mass of decisions 
affecting investments. Judicial processes, moreover, can be remote from the public so that they 
may be less able to integrate information and balance competing concerns than political processes. 
International courts particularly face information costs regarding domestic concerns, potentially 
giving rise to different forms of bias.129 Much criticism of ISDS, for example, contends that large 
multinational corporations, allied with the arbitration bar, bring aggressive claims to chill 
regulation that would otherwise serve the public interest.130 In addition, institutional mechanisms 
vary in their cost effectiveness in resolving disputes, which needs to be assessed. 
Since all institutional processes are imperfect, they are generally distrusted; but they are 
distrusted in different ways. The creation of investment rights implies distrust of national 
government, as well as markets. BITs imply a distrust of domestic law. The turn to ISDS implies 
distrust of domestic courts. The use of balancing tests by ISDS tribunals implies a distrust of 
political processes and markets. In turn, the proposal for a multilateral investment court system 
implies distrust of ISDS. This parade of institutional distrust is not surprising, since each 
institutional alternative is imperfect. For any meaningful policy analysis, however, their 
imperfections need to be compared and contrasted. 
Whatever the goals, and however they are characterized, comparative institutional analysis 
is required because institutional processes mediate the pursuit of such goals. As Komesar writes, 
“it is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal and public policy results.”131 In 
weighing different institutional alternatives, the issue of participation, shaped by numbers and per 
capita stakes, is always central. Biases exist in all institutions, but they differ in degree and kind. 
Only after comparative institutional analysis should choices be made. 
 
IV.  INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES AND INVESTMENT LAW 
 
An analysis of institutional alternatives for handling unfair treatment and expropriation of 
foreign direct investments should include not only the range of plausible adjudicatory options, but 
also non-adjudicatory mechanisms. We apply comparative institutional analysis to assess six types 
of such options: (1) market mechanisms; (2) political mechanisms; (3) domestic dispute settlement 
mechanisms; (4) independent interstate adjudicatory mechanisms; (5) international adjudicatory 
                                                 
128 Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Social Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95 (1974).  
129 On the relationship of mass public and international courts, see Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of 
International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2013). For some biases that result from the use of domestic 
courts in relation to domestic publics, see, e.g., Todd L. Allee & Paul K. Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: 
International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219 (2006). On the relationship of 
mass publics to courts, see John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 
(2002). 
130 See e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill, supra note 38, at 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (arguing 
that regulatory chill may be an important problem “inadequately addressed and often prematurely dismissed by legal 
scholars”). See also Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2015) (ISDS helps 
corporations “to create norms of international law—norms that bear a particular kind of relationship of priority to the 
state party’s domestic legal order”). For a critique of the arbitration bar, see Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting 
from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, CORP. EUR. 
OBSERVATORY & TRANSNAT’L. INST. (2012), http://corporateeurope.org/trade/ 2012/11/profiting-injustice. 
131 Komesar, supra note 2 at 5. 
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mechanisms as substitutes for domestic adjudication; and (6) international adjudicatory 
mechanisms as complements of domestic adjudication. We explain the trade-offs of each of these 
institutional alternatives in relation to the goals of investment law, on the one hand, and in light of 




Reputation, Contract, and Insurance 
 
The relative superiority of adjudication in relation to market mechanisms to ensure just 
treatment of foreign investors is not immediately evident, especially once one takes into account 
the economic, political, and social costs of litigation. These costs are particularly salient when 
companies can deploy the threat of international arbitration under BITs to “chill” regulatory 
initiatives. In such cases, to borrow from Brian Tamanaha, we risk seeing “the rule of some groups 
over others by and through the law,” more than a “rule of law that furthers the common good.”132 
In the discussion that follows, we address the trade-offs of three market mechanisms—reputation, 
contract, and political risk insurance—in light of the goals of investment law and the different 
biases of these mechanisms. 
The first market mechanism, reputation, is straightforward. Most States prefer to attract 
investment at a lower cost. Thus, if a State develops a reputation of high risk for foreign direct 
investment, investors will require a higher rate of return or will simply forego investing in the 
State. The market for capital investment thus creates pressure on States to treat foreign direct 
investment fairly. Indeed, states can, and at times do, enact foreign investment legislation through 
which they commit to use ISDS in limited ways; in this context, State governments are freer to 
tailor commitments to their view of State needs than when negotiating a BIT.133 
The market alone, however, may not induce countries to treat investment fairly. State 
officials may not consider reputational effects, or the countries’ approach towards foreign direct 
investment may change. Tomz shows that investors respond to the reputation of the government 
in power, and not of the State itself.134 The possibility of significant political change can thus make 
the assessment of reputation fragile, leading to a short-term focus. 
Second, investors can bargain with governments on a case-by-case basis and negotiate 
investment protections by contract, such as with a State-controlled enterprise. In these contracts, 
the parties may refer disputes to domestic courts, foreign courts, or international arbitration and 
specify the applicability of domestic, foreign, or international law.135 Brazil, for example, has 
                                                 





133 Christoph Schreurer, Investment Arbitration based on National Legislation, in Völkerrecht und die Dynamik der 
Menschenrechte, Liber Amicorum Wolfram Karl (2012), at 527. 
134 MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES 
(2007) 11-22, 39-113. See also, Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 231, 258 
(2009).  
135 Christopher Greenwood, State Contracts in International Law - The Libyan Oil Arbitrations, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 
L. 27 (1982). For contractual arbitration clauses to be effective, a body of law is generally needed to enforce the 
arbitration award, such as the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639
 25 
never adopted a BIT with ISDS, but it is among the world’s largest recipients of foreign direct 
investment—in part because investors are able to obtain protection through contracts that provide 
for arbitration.136 As Howse explains, “[a] contractual solution may be superior in many instances 
as the host State can target the protection to investors that it desires to attract.”137 
Existing data shows that resource-intensive sectors that require large up-front capital 
investments are frequent users of ISDS.138 Over half of all ISDS cases relate to oil, gas, and mining 
(25%), energy production (17%), or water, sanitation, and construction (12%)—sectors that 
require large capital investments.139 The irony is that it is precisely in these sectors, comprised of 
sophisticated multinational companies, where investors are relatively better positioned to resolve 
the “hold-up” risk through contract (which can provide, inter alia, for international arbitration), 
instead of relying on broad treaty protections with ISDS. These investors of course prefer the 
addition of ISDS—which creates a baseline of protection that includes an international remedy 
from which they can engage in further contracting—but the question is whether ISDS is necessary 
for them, especially in light of the problems with ISDS discussed below. 
Third, because economic actors may be unable to ‘self-insure’ efficiently, including by 
hedging against risks through diversifying, planning, or contracting, they may turn to the insurance 
market to reduce non-commercial risk. A market for political risk insurance can protect foreign 
investors, including against unfair, discriminatory, or expropriatory treatment.140 Insurance is 
often provided by governmental and international bodies (such as OPIC or MIGA).141 These 
bodies, in turn, can use political and legal mechanisms to press recalcitrant States to comply with 
their commitments to investors. 
There appears to be a renewed interest in returning to these market mechanisms. In the 
renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, USTR 
Lighthizer contended that U.S. investors should rely on political risk insurance if they are 
                                                 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.  
136 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES (2016), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf (ranking Brazil third for inward FDI between 1990-2015); 
HOGAN LOVELLS, RISK AND RETURN – FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015) available at 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf?showdocument=1 (reporting survey of industry 
leaders listing Brazil as among the countries where ‘rule of law’ issues can be avoided with arbitration). 
137 Howse, supra note 77 at 32. See also, Jason Webb Yackee.  Do We Really Need BITs?  Toward a Return to Contract 
in International Investment Law 3 ASIAN JOURNAL OF WTO AND HEALTH LAW 121 (2008) (on the desirability of 
contractual dispute settlement).  
138 [Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld, and David G. Victor, Predictability Versus Flexibility, 
68 WORLD POLITICS 413 (2016). Kobrin, supra note….] 
139 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, Issue 2016-17, ICSID, 12 (Dec. 31, 2017), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
1%20(English)%20Final.pdf.  
140 See Shihata, supra note 81 at 98–99 (describing the role of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency or MIGA in 
providing political risk insurance); Kenneth W. Hansen, Managing Political Risks in Emerging Market Investment, 
18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 77 (2004). 
141 See Eli Chalamish & Robert Howse, Conceptualizing Political Risk Insurance: Toward a Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), in THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF PUBLIC 
CONTRACTS (Mathias Audit & Stephan Scheill eds., 2015). 
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concerned about investment risk.142 This assertion has particular resonance for the large investors 
that bring most ISDS claims and are better positioned to purchase political risk insurance.143 
 
Trade-offs of Market Mechanisms 
 
Seen from the perspective of investment law’s goals, there are trade-offs to these market 
approaches. As regards fairness and the rule of law, market mechanisms such as reputation and 
risk insurance permit an investor to bypass court proceedings, effectively delegating these 
concerns to the market.144 Insurance alone, however, should be less effective than adjudication in 
deterring host government decisions ex ante because it focuses on replacement dollars paid by a 
third party based on a past event.145 Contracting, in contrast, permits the State and investor to 
define what is fair, subject to a dispute settlement mechanism to enforce the bargain. However, if 
most contracts provide for international commercial arbitration or a foreign judicial forum for 
dispute settlement, then there will be fewer incentives for the State to invest in independent, 
impartial, quality domestic dispute settlement mechanisms. Moreover, contracts and international 
commercial arbitration lack transparency, providing less assurance that public law concerns will 
be fairly addressed. As for the goal of interstate conflict avoidance, it is conventionally understood 
that international judicial processes are better than market approaches in constraining the 
investor’s home State from getting involved when a conflict escalates.146 
Market mechanisms are typically touted on efficiency grounds. However, contracting and 
insurance can be costly (because of bargaining and information costs), especially for small- and 
medium-sized investors. Given relatively fixed transaction costs, small investors are less likely to 
invest resources to bargain with governments for protections, including choice-of-law and dispute 
settlement clauses, to shield them against the risks of mistreatment. Where investors are priced out 
of or otherwise unable to obtain insurance or negotiate contracts, their investment may be deterred, 
raising the State’s cost of capital.147 Alternatively, States interested in reducing their cost of capital 
may invest in domestic institutions to encourage investment, reduce risk insurance premiums, and 
facilitate contract enforcement. In practice, therefore, market mechanisms may be sufficient in 
many cases. 
For major cross-cutting events such as civil war or economic crises affecting many or all 
investments, it arguably is preferable to rely on market mechanisms such as political risk insurance 
and currency and other forms of hedging, rather than ex post adjudication, so that investors take 
                                                 
142 Donnan, supra note 52. Cf. TAYLOR ST JOHN, THE RISE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 217-20 (2018) (noting that ISDS was promoted initially with the understanding that it 
would not promote FDI into developing countries at the expense of investments in the United States). 
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147 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: 
Revisiting the Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2009–2010 539, 543 
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precautions and price risks accordingly. An example is the collapse of the Argentine peso, which 
affected large numbers of investments in Argentina, and which arguably was a foreseeable risk 
over the long term given the history of financial crises in that country. As Anne van Aaken writes 
regarding one famous ISDS decision, “Although the tribunal held in its decision on jurisdiction 
that ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business judgments,’… 
insuring bad or at least quite imprudent business judgment is exactly the consequence of the CMS 
tribunal’s decision on the merits.”148 
In terms of bias in participation and decision-making, to the extent that contract and 
insurance are available only for large investors with high per capita stakes, these mechanisms can 
give rise to minoritarian bias in favor of those actors in relation to smaller investors, be they foreign 
or domestic. If market mechanisms fail to spur the development of domestic rule-of-law 
institutions, there will be ongoing risks of majoritarian and minoritarian biases against investors. 
However, these mechanisms remain important alternatives (or complements), especially for States 




Negotiation and Mediation 
 
Conflicts over the treatment of foreign direct investment can also be resolved through 
political bargaining, thus avoiding the cost of insurance or adjudication.149 Mediation—
negotiation facilitated by a neutral third party—seems to be increasingly used in international 
business generally,150 and negotiation has been used to address many investment conflicts.151 
While such negotiations and mediations often occur informally and without much transparency, 
some countries are promoting more institutionalized alternatives through treaties. For example, 
MERCOSUR’s Protocol on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation provides for direct State-to-
State negotiations (Article 24) and mediation (Article 23).152 These procedures are based on 
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Brazil’s model Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (“ACFI”), which the 
Brazilian government has promoted as an alternative to traditional BITs.153 
 
Trade-offs of Political Mechanisms 
 
Reliance on negotiation and mediation should be less likely to promote broader rule of law 
practices within domestic governance institutions since conflicts would be resolved in light of 
political objectives shaped by relative power. Fairness towards affected stakeholders would only 
be addressed as a function of their representation by States. Negotiations might be conducted in 
the shadow of the law, but references to the law might be just self-serving, cheap talk. Because of 
the uncertainty of these processes, they also would less likely advance the goal of reducing the 
cost of investment capital. These political options, however, could be cheaper since the parties 
would avoid the high costs associated with litigation.154 The host State could then use its resources 
in other more productive ways. 
Although diplomacy may work in some instances, it also can be complex, costly, and 
opaque. The more difficult that it is to understand channels of influence, the costlier it is for 
investors to organize for political action. Small- and medium-sized investors are likely to be 
particularly disadvantaged because they have less political access to State officials—who prioritize 
the deployment of State resources based on economic weight and systemic importance.155 In 
contrast, well-organized actors with substantial stakes are better positioned to trigger a response 
from the home State. Thus, when this institutional option is used successfully on behalf of an 
investor, it may be biased in favor of those investors with substantial stakes, reflecting minoritarian 
bias. When it fails to benefit an unjustly treated investor, it could reflect majoritarian bias. 
 
Domestic Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
 
Courts, Specialized Processes, and Ombudsman Offices 
 
Domestic dispute settlement mechanisms are the first (and fallback) option for resolving 
investment disputes through adjudication if negotiations fail. Domestic law can delegate 
investment disputes to specialized domestic courts and other institutions because of their expertise 
and to counter bias against outsiders.156 Iraq and Kazakhstan, for example, created specialized 
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investment courts to hear disputes between investors and investment authorities for these 
reasons.157 Other countries use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including (more 
recently) an investment ombudsman office.158 Morocco and South Korea mandate institutionalized 
mediation before a domestic institution—respectively, the Moroccan Investment Development 
Agency and the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board—prior to adjudication.159 
Domestic dispute settlement mechanisms can apply international law as part of domestic 
law. Depending on the State’s constitutional system, a domestic court can apply international law 
directly as part of the domestic legal system or indirectly through domestic implementing 
legislation.160 Thus, a national court or domestic authority may be able to decide the investment 
dispute by reference to a treaty or customary international law. 
 
Trade-offs of Domestic Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
 
Using domestic mechanisms, at least as a first instance, offers comparative advantages. 
First, the rule of law, broadly understood, depends on qualified, independent, impartial domestic 
dispute settlement institutions that can address the claims of all affected stakeholders. An 
advantage of addressing these claims together, including any counterclaims by the State or affected 
individuals or communities, is that a single forum can hear them. Relatedly, a broader range of 
actors have access to domestic proceedings so that more voices can be heard by decision-makers, 
which promotes fairness. Since a single venue would hear the claim, the process also could be 
more efficient. Domestic institutions are relatively more available to hear smaller cases that are 
important to smaller investors. International investment law’s effectiveness thus is bolstered by 
them, and at times depends on their hearing and resolving claims.161 Where a critical mass of actors 
uses domestic institutions to resolve investment disputes, these institutions can develop expertise 
and a professional ethos and reputation. Domestic institutions with these characteristics are more 
likely to be accepted as legitimate venues for resolving claims than a remote international body. 
This, in turn, can facilitate enforcement and compliance. 
The effective use of domestic mechanisms also can help to incentivize investment and 
support economic growth, thereby reducing a country’s cost of capital. A State that wishes to 
                                                 
157 For Iraq see U.S. Department of State, 2017 Investment Climate Statements (Jun. 29, 2017), 
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reduce its cost of capital thus has an incentive to invest in domestic institutions to uphold the rule 
of law. In contrast, automatic resort to international dispute settlement as a substitute for domestic 
mechanisms could reduce pressure to create national institutions that are independent and can hold 
governments accountable.162 
The internationalization of investment disputes, however, is a response to real deficiencies 
in many judicial systems and concerns over the impartiality of domestic authorities. From the 
perspective of capital exporting countries, national courts in many developing countries are unable 
to provide speedy, neutral, and technically competent resolution of investment claims.163 In these 
situations, investors prefer enforcement outside of local institutions to ensure fairness. Historically, 
developing countries have agreed to these processes in part because of power dynamics, but also 
often because they know that their domestic judicial systems can fail to provide such assurances. 
Domestic mechanisms also are prone to majoritarian bias and minoritarian bias. Local 
majorities can inflict high costs on investors where a single investor with high per capita stakes is 
on one side, and, on the other side, are large groups with low per capita stakes. Domestic 
authorities may not be able to withstand pressure to adopt popular decisions at the investor’s 
expense. At other times, domestic minoritarian interests may convince local authorities to take 
discriminatory action against a foreign investor. On the other hand, although one always can find 
examples of minoritarian bias, many studies find that foreign firms, on average, are treated at least 
the same or even better than domestic firms, such that the alternative of ISDS provides them with 
an even greater advantage.164 The choice of this option thus depends on context and, once again, 
its comparison with other institutional alternatives. 
 
Independent Interstate Adjudicatory Mechanisms 
 
In the investment context, a State can be sued before an international court or tribunal with 
jurisdiction when another State asserts diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals. In 
espousing an investor’s claim, the State operates independently of the investor, which has no direct 
control over the claim, unlike the other adjudicatory mechanisms we assess. Interstate adjudication 
of investment disputes generally does not result from acceptance of an international court’s 
jurisdiction before a dispute arises. Rather, States more commonly make arrangements after the 
conduct at issue occurs by creating ad hoc tribunals or consenting to jurisdiction for a specific 
case. Nonetheless, permanent bodies such as the ICJ or the WTO have heard some investment-
related complaints. 
 
Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
States have periodically created international claims commissions and ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals to adjudicate cases involving the seizure and mistreatment of foreign-held property.165 In 
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many of these instances, States established a semi-permanent body where only States have 
standing and control the selection of arbitrators. Some of these tribunals have been created 
following mediation or peace agreements involving diplomatic efforts and sometimes coercion. 
The best known example of interstate ad hoc adjudication of investment disputes because of its 
duration and number of awards is the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The tribunal was created pursuant 
to the Algiers Accords after Iran seized U.S. embassy officials as hostages and nationalized the 
assets of U.S. companies, and the United States, in turn, froze around US$11 billion of Iranian 
assets held in U.S. banks.166 During the 1980s and 1990s, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal created a 
huge body of investment law jurisprudence that laid important groundwork for ISDS case law.167 
The U.S. and Europe have generally stopped espousing investor claims, and, with ISDS, 
they have little reason to do so.168 The United Kingdom, for example, wound up its Foreign 
Compensation Commission, sending a general message that its investors are on their own (i.e., 
should rely on BITs) to resolve disputes.169 The United States still espouses investor claims, but 
its policy shifted so that it does not espouse a claim if the investor has other options available, such 
as before local courts or ISDS. Some States, however, have recently advocated for interstate 
alternatives to ISDS.170 Brazil’s ACFI, for example, permits State-to-State adjudication and 
explicitly rejects investor-State arbitration.171 South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act of 2015 
provides that the government may consent to State-to-State dispute settlement, rather than ISDS, 




Modern BITs have antecedents in FCN treaties, and some of these treaties provided for 
interstate dispute resolution before the ICJ. Very few cases before the ICJ, however, have involved 
the treatment of foreign investment. In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court found that the treaty 
at issue provided limited rights for shareholders, and it set a high bar for legal standing to invoke 
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Kreisberg ed. 1986). 
167 GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1996); David D. 
Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute 
Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 156 (1990) (noting that ICSID is part of an “evolving system” that included the 
Tribunal and “millions” spent on its operation and hundreds of awards rendered). 
168 As the ICJ noted in 2007, diplomatic protection under BITs has “somewhat faded, as in practice recourse is only 
made to it in rare cases where treaty regimes do not exist or have proved inoperative.” See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 582, 614, ¶ 88 (May 24). 
169 United Kingdom Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Fifty-Fourth Annual Report of the Foreign 
Compensation Commission for the Fiscal Year ended 31 March 2009 (2010),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-compensation-commission-fcc. 
170 See e.g., SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template, S. Afr. Dev. Community, Art. 29 (July 2012) 
(members include Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-templatefinal.pdf.  
171 Brazil ACFI supra note 146 art. 4. See e.g., Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement, art. 4 
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4717. 
172 South Africa Protection of Investment Act 22 supra note 49. 
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State responsibility on their behalf.173 Capital exporting countries, lobbied by multinational 
corporations, thus turned to more specialized bodies to resolve investment conflicts. 
In 1995, States created the WTO, the multilateral trade organization with a compulsory 
dispute settlement system. The WTO covers some investment-related disciplines in different 
agreements. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) addresses the establishment of 
a “commercial presence” in WTO Members to provide services (i.e., an investment). The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) prohibits investment measures that 
favor the use of domestic products over foreign ones, such as through domestic content regulations. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) prescribes rules 
protecting patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intellectual property. Some WTO members 
have continued to advocate for additional coverage of investment issues.174 Any WTO member 
can activate the WTO system of interstate adjudication, which does not require the exhaustion of 
local remedies. Its two-tier process includes an appellate body, which provides a precedent for the 
EU’s proposed multilateral investment court system. Indeed, rather than creating a new 
international organization with a new secretariat, an investment court could be housed at the WTO, 
which some favor.175 
A few WTO disputes have involved investment-related issues, including regarding GATS, 
TRIMS, and TRIPS, and a few of them were litigated in parallel to ISDS cases.176 However, 
because WTO claims are limited to the WTO covered agreements and because many countries’ 
commitments under the GATS are limited, WTO cases generally have not addressed the most 
frequently litigated ISDS claims regarding fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. They 
rather have involved claims over intellectual property and non-discrimination, especially since 
BITs and ISDS panels have adopted expansive definitions of “investment.” The most noteworthy 
case is Australia-Plain Tobacco Packaging where the WTO and ISDS claims were largely 
analogous, based on an alleged indirect expropriation of a Philip Morris brand (under the BIT 
claim) and the encumberment of the trademark (under the WTO TRIPs claim).177 There also have 
been parallel ISDS and WTO national treatment cases based on the same government measure, 
with the WTO cases addressing discrimination against traded goods and the ISDS ones involving 
discrimination against the foreign investor.178 Analogously, there were both WTO and ISDS 
                                                 
173 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 ICJ REP. 3, 32 (Judgment 
of Feb. 5).  
174 In 2017, twelve emerging economies, including Brazil, China, Mexico, and Pakistan, created a new group in the 
WTO named Friends of Investment Facilitation for Development to advance new investment-related proposals. See 
World Trade Organization, Trade and Investment Topics,  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
175 Interview with official of the European Commission, Brussels, May 16, 2018. 
176 See e.g., Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, 
WT/DS142/R (adopted 19 June 2000) as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, 
DSR 2000: VII, p. 3043 (involving investment related measures under TRIMS and GATT); Australia—Certain 
Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and 
Packaging, WT/DS434 (Ukraine), WT/DS435 (Honduras), WT/DS441 (DR), WT/DS458 (Cuba), WT/DS467 
(Indonesia) (involving IP related measures under TRIPS); United States - Measures Concerning Non-Immigrant Visas 
- Request for consultations by India - WT/DS503/1/Add.1 (18 March 2016) (involving measures under GATS). 
177 Cf. Australia—Certain Measures, supra note…; and Philip Morris Asia v. the Commonwealth of Australia, Philip 
Morris Asia Notice of Arbitration, ¶7.15–7.17 (Nov. 21, 2012). 
178 For example, American fructose producers brought three ISDS cases against Mexico in response to a Mexican tax 
on soft drinks with an exemption for those using cane sugar (which came from Mexican producers), while the United 
States successfully brought a WTO claim against the same discriminatory tax. The U.S.-Canada softwood lumber saga 
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claims brought against Mexico’s telecommunications regulations that favored the Mexican quasi-
monopolist Telmex.179 More generally, WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence upholding non-
discriminatory State regulation has been cited and arguably influenced ISDS cases regarding the 
need for balance in recognizing a State’s right to regulate.180 
 
Trade-offs of Independent Interstate Adjudicatory Mechanisms 
 
These two types of interstate options—ad hoc tribunals and permanent courts—present 
similar trade-offs, but they also exhibit some important differences. Both permanent and ad hoc 
bodies can provide some support for adherence to the rule of law, and thus provide some assurance 
of fair treatment of investors. However, a permanent international court hearing investment claims 
offers certain advantages over ad hoc dispute settlement. First, it can create greater certainty that 
claims may be brought, since no further negotiations are needed to create the tribunal. Second, a 
multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, as under the WTO, can cover the major nations of the 
world, operate iteratively over time in clarifying and enforcing legal commitments, and thus have 
more normative authority than ad hoc bodies.181 This is particularly the case of an international 
mechanism with an appeals system, such as the WTO Appellate Body, which has generated a 
substantial and influential jurisprudence, including regarding a State’s right to regulate.182 As a 
result, permanent interstate bodies could better facilitate the diffusion of norms of fairness, helping 
to enhance rule-of-law accountability in domestic jurisdictions. 
Interstate adjudicatory mechanisms offer both benefits and raise concerns because of State 
control of the process. On the one hand, States may represent the broader interests of their citizens, 
as opposed to only investor commercial interests. Because interstate alternatives constrain access 
to dispute settlement, they create an opportunity for States to screen controversial, overly-
aggressive, or illegitimate claims.183 Moreover, this alternative permits States to control the 
arguments brought before tribunals regarding the interpretation of the treaty they negotiated. This 
power is important, since in many instances States could be on either side of investment claims—
as a defendant or as a complainant espousing a national’s claims. Having States act as filters can 
be beneficial because it eliminates corporate actors’ ability to aggressively pursue adjudication 
                                                 
also included parallel ISDS and WTO claims for violation of national treatment clauses. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost 
Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin? 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 49-50 (2008) (on the sweeteners and lumber disputes). 
179 See Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/3 (Feb. 18, 2002); and Notice of 
Intent, Telefónica S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/4 available 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1040.pdf. 
180 See e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 87 
(Sept. 5, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf. See generally, Greg Tereposky & 
Morgan Maguire, Utilizing WTO Law in Investor State Dispute Settlement, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 247 (Arthur Rovine ed., 2011). 
181 See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate 
Body, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 271 (2016). 
182 Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by the Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 9 (2016). 
183 For example, the case brought by Ely Lilly challenging a Canadian Supreme Court’s decision regarding the criteria 
of patentability, and the case brought by Philip Morris against Uruguayan regulatory measures advocated by the World 
Health Organization have been hugely controversial. See Eli Lilly and Co. v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/14/2 Final Award (16 March 2017); and FTR Holding S.A., Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) & Abal 
Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (2010), Award (Jul. 8, 2016).  
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through ISDS—whether to bargain in the law’s shadow, counter prospective regulation through 
the threat of an expensive lawsuit, or to shape the law’s interpretation—and can thus be relatively 
less biased against States and the other stakeholder interests that States represent. Because States 
retain control of dispute settlement, they can focus on long-term mutual gains, rather than short-
term victories in investment disputes. 
On the other hand, because the system is State-based, it retains a political/diplomatic 
dimension and thus does not focus directly on the fair treatment of private parties, nor on enhancing 
the rule of law in domestic jurisdictions. States may sacrifice a private party’s interests and decide 
not to bring a claim.184 In addition, States control the selection of judges, so that the judges in these 
bodies may have only moderate independence.185 Moreover, remedies issued by interstate bodies 
may not benefit the harmed investor. The primary WTO remedy, for example, is the withdrawal 
of equivalent concessions by the complaining State, which provides no compensation to the 
aggrieved private party.186 In consequence, investors could be warier about investing in the State 
in question, potentially increasing that State’s cost of capital. Finally, in terms of international 
relations, this mechanism may be less likely to depoliticize a conflict since the bringing of claims 
by one State against another could be viewed as an unfriendly, political act, at least more so than 
when an investor brings the claims on its own.187 
In terms of participation and bias, because States exercise discretion as to whether to 
espouse a claim, participation will more likely be skewed in favor of well-connected private 
parties. States may only espouse claims of nationals that are politically influential and vociferously 
lobby them. They may only represent claims of large companies, so that small- and medium-sized 
companies’ claims are sacrificed in the interest of interstate relations, and hence result in 
minoritarian bias. International adjudicatory bodies (whether permanent or ad hoc) also could 
exhibit bias in favor of powerful States, such as to ensure their support for the overall system so 
that it does not collapse.188 Yet, once again, the benefits and deficiencies of this alternative must 
be assessed against those besetting other decision-making processes in light of particular State 
contexts. 
 
                                                 
184 Stephan Schill, Enhancing the Legitimacy of International Investment Law: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 68 (2011) (“While this solution would allow states 
to exclude spurious or frivolous claims, it would equally permit them to discard claims for foreign policy reasons”); 
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 277–78 (6th ed., 1963) (arguing that State-to-State procedure “is far from 
satisfactory from the individual’s point of view. He has no remedy of his own, and the state to which he belongs may 
be unwilling to take up his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits”). 
185 Cf. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005) 
(judges are “independent” when they are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and serve fixed terms); and 
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors 
Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005) (discussing political constraints that operate on international courts and 
tribunals.) 
186 See Sykes, supra note 71 at 643. 
187 See e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REV. 438, 454 (1947), reprinted in 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 487, 504 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1975) 
(arguing that the espousal of a claim by the state tends to impart the complexion of political controversy and unfriendly 
action). 
188 See e.g., Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 74 
(2006) (“state behavior and associated international outcomes may appear to be shaped by international law, but 
because international law mirrors the interests of powerful states, international law is merely an epiphenomenon of 
underlying power”). 
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International Adjudicatory Mechanisms as Substitutes 
 
The proliferation of ISDS cases and large damage awards has catalyzed debates over 
institutional reform, notably over whether to create a multilateral investment court system. 
Although both ISDS and such a system could operate as complements to domestic mechanisms, 
we address the two options as substitutes because that is how they have been proposed and 
operated.189 
 
Ad hoc Tribunals—ISDS 
 
ISDS is the dominant method for international investment adjudication today. Thousands 
of BITs provide for it, as do many free trade agreements such as NAFTA. ISDS is a mechanism 
through which investors may directly obtain damages from States for breaches of international 
investment law by bringing claims to an arbitral panel.190 ICSID provides the main pillar for ISDS, 
although approximately 39% of proceedings take place outside of ICSID, such as through the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and other 
bodies.191 Individual arbitrations have produced awards of over a billion dollars, and numerous 
awards are in the hundreds of millions.192 The awards are binding on the parties and not subject to 
appeal or to any other checks except on very limited grounds.193 
 
Trade-offs of ISDS 
 
ISDS offers many institutional advantages, especially for investors. Compared to domestic 
mechanisms, ISDS guarantees foreign investors access to a specialized adjudicatory process that 
is independent of national authorities. It provides an alternative where domestic systems lack 
reliable, quality, impartial courts. Compared to the interstate alternative, the investor has a private 
right of action and does not depend on the State to espouse its claim. It is thus viewed as a more 
                                                 
189 See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108 (2005) (concluding that in many cases BITs with ISDS operate as 
substitutes, rather than compliments, of local institutions); Center for International Environmental Law, Position 
Paper: EU Proposal for a Multilateral Reform of Investment Dispute Resolution, March 15, 2017 at p. 5 (criticizing 
the proposal for “allowing investors to side step” domestic courts). 
190 ICSID arbitration tribunals are typically composed of three members. Both the investor and the State select one 
arbitrator and they jointly agree on a third arbitrator as chair, failing which the chair is selected by the President of the 
World Bank (or, in some instances, the co-arbitrators). ICSID Convention, supra note 24 at arts. 37-38. In practice, 
the Secretary-General of ICSID recommends a Chair to the World Bank President. 
191 UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures 
(UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/7) Nov. 7 2017 available 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf. 
192 Id. (noting that between 1987-2017, “in cases decided in favour of the investor, the average amount claimed was 
$1.35 billion and the median $113 million. The average amount awarded was $522 million and the median $19 
million.”) 
193 ICSID Convention, supra note 24 at art 52 (providing for annulment of an award on five limited grounds). ICSID’s 
Additional Facility (AF), which can be used by non-ICSID members, does not grant arbitration awards the benefit of 
ICSID annulment procedures. See ICSID, ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, ICSID DOC. ICSID/11 (2006). In the latter 
case, ICSID awards are subject to review by national courts. However, the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards limits the scope of national court review if the State is a party to that 
convention. 
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legal and less political process than interstate dispute settlement.194 Accordingly, ISDS should be 
more attractive to investors, although the investor must cover its share of the cost of arbitration. 
To the extent that ISDS provides greater assurances to investors that they will be fairly 
treated in accordance with basic rule-of-law protections, then ISDS could help States to attract 
investment, thus contributing to resource allocation efficiency and aggregate national welfare. In 
addition, from the perspective of interstate relations, ISDS compartmentalizes conflicts between 
States by providing investors with legal standing to bring claims. To some, it thus appears superior 
from the perspective of interstate conflict avoidance.195 
ISDS is also subject to disadvantages in terms of investment law’s goals. From the 
perspective of fairness, many contend that ISDS is biased in favor of investors.196 From the 
perspective of the rule of law, since ISDS decisions are made on an ad hoc basis and are not subject 
to appeal, they have resulted in many inconsistencies and contradictions, such that like cases are 
not decided alike.197 From the perspective of resource allocation efficiency, since countries balance 
investment promotion against other social welfare goals, if ISDS is biased against other State social 
welfare policies, then any additional investment is not optimal.198 Moreover, ISDS jurisprudence 
generated by investor claims, has created considerable uncertainty, both because of its 
inconsistencies and because it frequently calls into question contractual commitments that are 
overridden by BIT claims.199 In addition, empirical studies question whether BITs with ISDS, in 
fact, leads to greater foreign direct investment.200 From the perspective of depoliticization, 
investors at times bring claims that implicate highly sensitive domestic policies, thus increasing 
conflict and political tension. 
Perhaps most importantly, the rule of law ultimately depends on domestic governance, but 
ISDS has operated as a substitute for local courts. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention does not 
require “exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies” “unless otherwise stated” in a 
treaty, and in practice most BITs do not require it.201 Indeed, for years ICSID highlighted the 
importance of abstention from domestic courts as “essential to the proper implementation” of 
ISDS.202 In fact, many BITs contain a fork-in-the-road provision that makes the use of local courts 
                                                 
194 Reisman Opinion, supra note 29 at 20-1 (noting ISDS as removing “the caprice of sovereign-to-sovereign 
politics”). 
195 Roberts, Triangular Treaties, supra note 73 at 378-80. 
196 See supra note… [citing Schneiderman and Sonarajah]. 
197 See supra note… Cf. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 34, at 220 (‘[t]he more the judicial model has been 
institutionalized, the more inconsistent decisions are treated as signatures of (treatable) pathology”); Laurence Boisson 
de Chazournes, Plurality in the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals the Threads of a Managerial Approach' 
28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 46 (2017) (explaining how procedural mechanisms are being used to a greater extent to mitigate 
inconsistencies). 
198 See supra note… 
199 See Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties, 58 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 351 
(2016) (“arbitral jurisprudence has varied wildly on this point, creating significant problems of certainty, efficiency, 
and fairness—for states and foreign investors alike”). 
200 UNCTAD, The Impact of International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of 
Empirical Studies 1998–2014, Sept. 2014 (reviewing 35 published and unpublished studies). 
201 ICSID Convention, supra note 24 art. 26. For practice, see Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 20 at 268. 
202 See Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 784 (1983); B. P. Marchais, ICSID 
and the Courts, NEWS OF ICSID 4 (Summer 1986). 
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“fatal to any attempt to use the BIT’s investor-to-state disputes procedure.”203 Where ISDS 
discourages a relationship of complementarity with domestic courts, it can reduce the pressure for 
domestic rule-of-law reforms.204 It thus tends to promote exit (from domestic legal systems) over 
voice (in domestic law reform debates).205 
In terms of participation and bias, adjudication can offer the advantage of evenhandedness 
and legal reasoning to counter potential majoritarian bias against investors. ISDS, however, 
involves high access costs, is removed from mass publics, and is commonly charged with failure 
to appropriately balance competing interests, in part because of the inability of States and other 
stakeholders to raise claims and counterclaims against investors.206 Moreover, unlike judges, 
arbitrators in ISDS are nominated by the parties. This selection process may shape their 
dispositions, reflecting different forms of bias—categorized as selection, compensation, and 
affiliation bias.207 Some arbitrators represent and consult for private clients in their legal practice, 
and thus may face conflicts of interest.208 Structurally, since the ISDS system is highly 
remunerative for private practitioners, and since the arbitrators are paid on a case-by-case basis 
(and by the hour), the arbitrators have an incentive to ensure the future flow of claims. ISDS thus 
can lead to minoritarian bias in favor of investors, especially those that are well-organized, because 
they have high per capita stakes, compared to other stakeholders that are numerous but 
disorganized due to their low per-capita stakes. 
 
International Courts—Multilateral Investment Court System 
 
Because of the criticisms of ISDS, the EU and many commentators have advocated for the 
creation of a specialized multilateral investment court system containing an appellate body. What 
the EU proposal and ISDS have in common is a private right of standing to bring international 
claims directly against States.209 They differ in their form—mainly, ad hoc arbitration versus a 
                                                 
203 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 
258 (1988) 441-2 (explaining that fork-in-the-road require an investor to choose to submit a claim either before 
domestic courts or international arbitration). 
204 See e.g. Anne van Aaken, The Interaction of Remedies between National Juridical Systems and ICSID: An 
Optimization Problem, in THE FUTURE OF ICSID AND THE PLACE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
EDS, N. JANSEN CALAMITA, DAVID EARNEST & MARKUS BURGSTALLER 291, 324 (2013) (“This deprives the State of 
the opportunity to reconsider its decision through administrative or judicial review and grant primary remedies. A 
better solution would be to allow for review of a government measure under domestic law without construing such a 
challenge as a violation of the BIT protections”).  
205 A. O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
STATES (1970). 
206 There are exceptions and ISDS respondents bring counterclaims, but they are typically unsuccessful; see e.g., 
Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Environmental Counterclaim, ¶ 447 (Aug. 
11, 2015), IIC 699 (2015). For an extensive discussion, see, Frederic Gilles Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155 (2017). 
207 Puig supra note 41 (discussing biases in ISDS). See also, Sergio Puig and Anton Strezhnev, Affiliation Bias in 
Arbitration: An Experimental Approach, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (2017) (providing evidence of bias). 
208 Langford et. al, The Revolving Door, supra note… (providing empirical evidence of double-hating); Nassib G. 
Ziadé, How Many Hats Can a Player Wear: Arbitrator, Counsel and Expert?, 24 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L. J. 49 
(2009). 
209 See e.g., Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 12981/17 ADD 1 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 1 March 2018. See also, European Commission, 
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two-tier system with a standing court and appeals court. At the outset, it is important to note that 
if a multilateral international court system is created, as through the UNCITRAL process, it could 
potentially depart from the EU proposed model in significant ways.210 Analysis should thus 
include how the EU proposal may be adapted.211 
The EU proposal is not the first for a permanent investment court.212 Notably, the 1974 
Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes between Host States of Arab Investments 
and Nationals of Other Arab States created the Arab Court of Investment, which is now active.213 
Unlike this regional system, however, the system pursued by the EU bilaterally and multilaterally 
has the potential to extend beyond a discrete geographical region and be widely used. 
The EU is incrementally creating a base for such a system through signing bilateral 
agreements, such as with Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam,214 while the EU continues to 
promote the multilateral investment court system in parallel. These agreements are pending 
ratification by each of the EU Member States, which will take time, and Belgium has requested 
the CJEU to issue an opinion regarding the compatibility with EU law of CETA’s provisions 
regarding an investment court system.215 Under these agreements, claims are to be heard by three-
member divisions of a permanent court, which would replace the system of party appointments.216 
The court’s decision is subject to appeal before a tribunal comprised of six members who must 
“have demonstrated expertise in public international law.”217 The grounds for appeal include errors 
of law and manifest errors of fact, in addition to the grounds provided in Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention.218 The appeal tribunal would have the power to “modify or reverse” the panel’s 
decision or remand it for further consideration. The contracting States would select the members 
of the court and appeal tribunal, who would be paid a regular salary, enjoy security of tenure for a 
fixed, non-renewable term (around four to five years), and be subject to a set of ethical obligations 
                                                 
Reading Guide, European Commission Fact Sheet – Reading Guide (Sept. 16, 2015)  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-5652_en.pdf. 
210 Roberts, supra note 1 at […]. 
211 Id. 
212 Taylor St. John and Yulia Chernykh, Déjà vu? Investment Court Proposals from 1960 and Today, EJIL: TALK! 
May 15, 2018 https://www.ejiltalk.org/deja-vu-investment-court-proposals-from-1960-and-today/ (explaining that 
“in the 1950s and 1960s, eminent international lawyers from around the world … discussed an international investment 
court, notably at International Law Association conferences”). 
213 The Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between Host States of Arab Investments and Nationals 
of Other Arab States, Jun. 10, 1974, reproduced in French in 1981 Rev. Arb. 348; and Unified Agreement for the 
Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States, Nov. 26, 1980, 
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/36%20volume%202.pdf. See also Walid Ben Hamida, The 
Development of the Arab Investment Court's Case Law: New Decisions Rendered by the Arab Investment Court, 6 
INT’L J. ARAB ARB. 12 (2014). 
214 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra note…  
216 The divisions would be composed of members randomly selected from the Tribunal, consisting of a roster with 
fixed term appointments created by the treaty parties. At least for a transitional period, the Tribunal members would 
be paid a monthly retainer complemented by the scheduled ICSID hourly fees when they serve on a Tribunal, and 
they would not be barred from working on arbitration cases. After the transitional period, they are to be paid a salary 
and hired on a full-time basis. See Negotiating Directives supra note 204. Until the system becomes fully 
operationalized, the proposed Tribunal would retain a number of ISDS characteristics, raising questions regarding the 
extent of its differentiation from ISDS. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner supra note 54. 
217 See e.g., CETA, supra note 27, art 8.27(4).  
218 Id., art 8.28. 
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to ensure independence and impartiality.219 If the multilateral investment court system draws from 
this model, many further procedural details remain to be determined by the parties that choose to 
join it. The EU’s treaties, such as CETA, commit the parties to apply a multilateral mechanism 
once established.220 
 
Trade-offs of the Multilateral Investment Court System 
 
As regards fairness, some commentators contend that a multilateral investment court 
system would be less fair for investors because States would control the nomination of judges and 
thus the judges would favor States.221 Other commentators object to the notion that fairness 
requires allowing private parties to choose their own judges when suing States, given the broader 
public policy interests are at stake.222 Arguably, when selecting permanent judges ex ante rather 
than ad hoc arbitrators ex post, treaty parties have a greater incentive to internalize their interests 
as capital-importers and -exporters and thus pick balanced judges, rather than pro-state or pro-
investor ones, who are committed to upholding the treaty parties’ agreement.223 For many skeptics 
of ISDS, a court should be better positioned to balance investor rights against other public policy 
goals, as reflected in the principle of a State’s right to regulate. In addition, a court with an appellate 
mechanism is more likely to treat like cases alike, so that investors’ claims will be treated more 
consistently (especially where the text of the applicable legal instruments is the same). 
The proposed multilateral investment court system also provides greater opportunities than 
ISDS for repeat interaction with national courts. These interactions are more likely to give rise to 
a common understanding of legal obligations. If that occurs, then the court may be better 
positioned to advance rule-of-law norms within domestic governance. Nonetheless, since the 
proposed system is structured as a substitute for domestic courts (subject to reservations), it also 
is less likely than complementary mechanisms to place pressure on national governments to ensure 
the independence, impartiality, and quality of their domestic dispute settlement systems.224 
Commentators also contend that a multilateral court system would be less biased than ISDS 
in favor of major powers, and in particular the United States. Gus Van Harten, for example, notes 
that under ICSID, the authority to appoint arbitrators that the parties do not designate, such as the 
chair of the tribunal, is vested in an official who is close to the U.S. government.225 The Convention 
empowers the Chairman of ICSID’s Administrative Council (i.e., the President of the World Bank, 
who always has been a U.S. national) to select from among a roster of arbitrators the remaining 
                                                 
219 Id., art 8.30(1). 
220 See e.g. CETA supra note 47 art 8.29 (“Upon establishment of such a multilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint 
Committee shall adopt a decision providing that investment disputes under this Section will be decided pursuant to 
the multilateral mechanism and make appropriate transitional arrangements”). 
221 See Schwebel, supra note 54. 
222 See Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court (SOC’Y OF INT’L ECON. L. INAUGURAL CONF., 
Working Paper No. 22/08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com /abstract=1153424 and 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153424. 
223 Anthea Roberts, Would a Multilateral Investment Court be Biased? Shifting to a treaty party framework of analysis, 
EJIL TALK! April 28, 2017. 
224 This feature, however, might be reconsidered if a multilateral convention were to be negotiated following 
developments in the UNCITRAL working group. See Roberts, supra note 1 at […]. 
225 Gus Van Harten supra note 225 at […]. ICSID only appoints arbitrators when the parties themselves appoint them 
or when the parties have not agreed on the Chair or another means to select the Chair, such as by the other two 
arbitrators. 
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arbitrator(s). In practice, this function is performed on the recommendation of ICSID’s Secretary-
General whom a former Secretary-General of ICSID has accused of “paying heed” to the United 
States and other rich countries.226 Interestingly, the United States has never lost an ISDS case.227 
From the perspective of resource allocation efficiency, if a permanent court is more 
deferential toward States because States appoint the judges, then, in theory, investors could be 
warier of investing, raising a State’s cost of capital. Yet, for investment protection to be optimal, 
States should balance foreign investment with other social welfare goals, and tribunals should not 
privilege investor protection over those goals. Moreover, there is little reason to believe, and no 
empirical evidence to substantiate, that rational investors would be less likely to invest under a 
multilateral investment court system rather than ISDS—although the court could face backlog 
problems since it cannot expand the number of panels in response to a large number of new claims 
as the ISDS regime. In addition, although maintaining a permanent court has costs, ISDS may be 
just as expensive, especially since annulment proceedings are frequently used. Thus, institutional 
costs should be given limited weight in deciding between them (especially if the costs can be 
transferred partially to the disputing parties), although they could be a factor in relation to other 
alternatives.228  
The proposed multilateral investment court system should have similar, although 
potentially not as robust, positive effects as ISDS on depoliticizing disputes. Permitting investors 
to take disputes directly could depoliticize them as compared to having them resolved through 
diplomatic confrontation. Yet, because States control the appointment of the judges, the process 
could become politicized, as seen in the crisis besetting the WTO’s Appellate Body.229 Members 
of the international investment law community fear a similar attack on an investment court. 
In terms of bias, depending on implementation details regarding the cost of access, 
transparency, and the process of nominating adjudicators, the proposed multilateral investment 
court system could better balance investors’ legitimate expectations against State regulatory goals. 
                                                 
226 See, Douglas Thomson, Is ICSID a “Monarchy”?, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (2016) (citing Nassib Ziade, former 
Secretary-General of ICSID). Both the President of the Bank and the Secretary-General of ICSID have routinely been 
accused of bias in the practice of appointments. See Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations and Rules 
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J, 55 (2007). 
227 In one infamous case, commentators broadly view the result as a function of political pressure. See e.g., Jan 
Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein 
Distinguished Scholar Chair at the Miami University School of Law 11 (Apr. 29, 2010), available at www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/4/69377396990603/media012773749999020 
paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf, at 6 (citing a conference recording where the arbitrator admitted he “had met with 
officials of the U.S. Department of Justice prior to accepting the appointment, and that they had told him: ‘You know, 
judge, if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA’. He remembered his answer as having been ‘Well, if you want to 
put pressure on me, then that does it’).  
228 See European Commission, State of the Union 2017: A Multilateral Investment Court available 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf (“The interested parties would need to 
negotiate the budget and financing of the multilateral investment court. Like all other international organizations, the 
contracting parties would in principle finance the court. Its costs would depend on: the number of employed judges; 
the size of the secretariat; the number of contracting parties”). 
229 Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Mark Pollack, Trump is fighting an open war on trade. His stealth war on trade 
may be even more important, WASH. POST (Sep. 27, 2017). See also Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. 
Helfer, Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 293 (2016) (on the Zimbabwe government’s blocking of the Tribunal for the South African Development 
Community after a decision against it); and Dapo Akande, ICJ Elections 2017: UN General Assembly and Security 
Council Elect Four Judges to the ICJ But fail to Agree on a Fifth, yet again! + Trivia Question, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 
11, 2017). 
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It thus has the potential to correct some of the minoritarian biases associated with ISDS while also 
helping to counter majoritarian biases in domestic decision-making. Nonetheless, use of a 
permanent court would remain expensive, thus favoring those with high per capita stakes, such as 
large investors. If such potential bias raises concerns, the question remains: compared to what? 
 
International Adjudicatory Mechanisms as Complements 
 
A final adjudicative alternative is a system of complementarity under which domestic and 
international dispute settlement processes are linked. This alternative prioritizes the use and 
development of domestic institutions (courts or otherwise), which are first given the opportunity 
to decide the matter. An international adjudicatory body acts as a backdrop, which, depending on 
how the process is structured, potentially overrules, takes account, or provides guidance for the 
domestic determinations. 
There are multiple ways to design complementary processes. We present three examples 
of existing international mechanisms that could motivate experimentation: (i) direct review of 
domestic administrative or judicial decisions by an international panel, as reflected in NAFTA 
Chapter 19; (ii) independent review of compliance with international law commitments after the 
exhaustion of domestic judicial procedures, as before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR); and (iii) referrals by national courts to an international court, as under the preliminary 
reference procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). We then briefly note 
other variants that could be considered, such as abstention and certification, which are used in 
other contexts, including some federal jurisdictions.  
 
International Review of Domestic Decisions 
 
One option involving complementarity is to provide for domestic decision-making up to a 
certain stage, subject to review by an international adjudicatory body. NAFTA review of 
antidumping and countervailing duty decisions by national administrative bodies provides an 
example. Chapter 19 of the trade agreement provides that the State of nationality of the foreign 
exporter may, or upon the exporter’s request shall, request the establishment of a binational panel 
to review the final determination issued by the relevant authority of the NAFTA party.230 The 
binational panel, composed of five members from the two countries involved, can affirm, overrule, 
or remand agency determinations. The decisions are binding within the domestic jurisdiction and 
cannot be appealed to domestic courts. The process is complemented by an extraordinary challenge 
procedure where a NAFTA party can challenge a binational panel ruling on limited grounds, such 
as for manifestly exceeding its powers.231 
Under NAFTA Chapter 19, each party applies its domestic law, which it is free to amend 
at any time provided that its domestic law complies with WTO rules.232 WTO law, in turn, is 
                                                 
230 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, at art. 1904.5. See also David A. Gantz, 
Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA 's Chapter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process 
to Mexico, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 297, 298 (1998). 
231 NAFTA, supra note 226, at art. 1904.13. The challenge is before a committee of three members from the three 
countries chosen from a 15-person roster. See NAFTA Annex 1904.13. Id. at art. 1902.2 (providing amendments to 
domestic law must comply with the GATT and antidumping and subsidy codes and any “successor agreement”). 
232 Id. at arts. 1902.2 (providing amendments to domestic law must comply with the GATT and antidumping and 
subsidy codes and any “successor agreement”). 
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enforced through interstate dispute settlement, which helps to clarify the meaning of the 
provisions.233 The binational panel’s determination focuses exclusively on the correct application 
of the law by the domestic authority conducting the investigation, creating an international check 
on the domestic decision-making process. As a result, binational panels replace judicial review of 
national administrative decisions by national courts. 
In theory, parties could adapt this process to provide for first-level judicial review before a 
national court, subject to appeal before an international tribunal. The ability to appeal judicial 
decisions to an international panel can check bias in national decision-making, but it also raises 
sovereignty concerns. Indeed, the current U.S. administration wants to terminate NAFTA Chapter 
19, and others in the United States have questioned Chapter 19’s constitutionality.234 Similarly, 
Belgium has asked the CJEU to issue an opinion on the compatibility of the investment court 
system under CETA with EU law, and the CJEU held in March 2018 that the provisions for ISDS 
in a BIT between EU Member States are incompatible with EU law.235 The sovereignty concerns 
would become even more salient were an international body to overrule a domestic court’s 
application of domestic law. Reflecting this concern, India’s new model BIT provides that arbitral 
tribunals shall not have jurisdiction “to re-examine any legal issue which has been finally settled 
by any judicial authority of the Host State.”236 
 
International Claims after Domestic Proceedings 
 
A second option is to permit a private party to bring a claim before an international 
adjudicatory body under international law, but only after exhausting domestic remedies. This 
approach differs from the first in that the international adjudicator does not apply domestic law, 
nor does it directly review or reverse a domestic administrative or judicial finding. Rather, the 
international mechanism applies international law and commences proceedings only after 
domestic law processes are completed. 
The ECtHR exemplifies this approach. The court has jurisdiction to hear disputes filed by 
private parties as well as States under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and its 
Protocols against any of the 47 members of the Council of Europe. The ECtHR has heard 
investment law claims under the right to property enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the 
                                                 
233 For example, the U.S. lost a series of WTO cases in which countries challenged its practice of using “zeroing” to 
find dumping and inflate antidumping margins. Chapter 19 binational panels subsequently held against U.S. 
administrative findings that used zeroing. See e.g., Article 1904 Binational Panel Review Pursuant to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip In Coils from Mexico: Final Results of 2004/2005 
Antidumping Review, USA-MEX-2007-1904-01 (Apr. 14, 
2010),  http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta19/stainlessincoils-dumping-nafta19.pdf. 
234 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE NAFTA 
RENEGOTIATIONS p. 14 (Jul. 17, 217), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf 
(listing among the objectives of the NAFTA renegotiation: “Eliminate the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism”). 
Scholars have contested whether use of Chapter 19 panels is constitutional, but it so far has withstood constitutional 
challenge. See e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Provisions of the 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299 (1992).  
235 See Belgium, Opinion (Opinion 1/17) on the Compatibility of CETA Investment Court System with EU Law; and 
Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V. (Case C-284/16) CJEU Mar. 6, 2018, paras. 56-60 (precluding ISDS under an 
agreement between the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic because of its implications for the 
effectiveness of EU law). 
236 Model Indian BIT, supra note 51, at Art. 14(2)(ii). 
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ECHR.237 Most notably, the ECtHR heard a challenge relating to Russia’s nationalization of the 
Yukos oil company, issuing a €1.87 billion award against Russia in 2014—the largest award in 
the court’s history—although Russia has yet to pay it.238 
Article 35 of the ECHR requires the exhaustion of local remedies before a party may 
initiate a claim before the court.239 The rationale for the rule is to afford domestic authorities the 
opportunity to prevent or correct an alleged international law violation. A domestic court can, in 
the process, apply the international standard and internalize it as part of domestic law. When 
praising the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, Louis Sohn and Richard Baxter emphasized the 
benefits of putting domestic courts in the front line to oversee compliance with international law 
obligations and enhance international law’s effectiveness.240 
The use of exhaustion represents a form of “subsidiarity,” a principle which favors 
decision-making at the local level where possible.241 The ECtHR complements the subsidiarity 
principle with the principle of a “margin of appreciation,” under which the court grants local 
decision-makers a degree of discretion in applying ECHR standards in light of local contexts and 
conditions.242 The court varies its application of the margin as a function of the sufficiency and 
effectiveness of domestic procedures and remedies.243 In doing so, it arguably provides an 
incentive for domestic authorities to improve the domestic rule of law. 
 
Interpretation at the Request of National Courts 
 
Under a third option, domestic courts could be required to submit questions to an 
international adjudicatory body concerning an issue of international law that has not been clearly 
settled. The response by the international body—likely a court—is binding as a matter of law. 
Unlike under the first and second complementarity options, it is the national court that ultimately 
                                                 
237 See generally, Christian Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch & 
Stephan Wittich eds., 2009). 
238 OAO Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment on Just Satisfaction 
(2014). 
239 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols Number 11 
and Number 14 art. 35, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. No. 194 [hereinafter ECHR]. The complainant only needs to raise the 
issue implicitly before local courts, or address it in terms of substance, in which case the exhaustion rule is satisfied. 
Only in very limited circumstances may an affected party be exempted from the requirement of exhausting local 
remedies.  
240 Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 
(1961) reprinted in RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR  INJURIES TO  ALIENS 262 
(F. V. Garcia-Amador, Louis Sohn & Richard Baxter eds., 1974) (noting how “exhaustion of local remedies” “forc[es] 
the maximum number of cases involving aliens into domestic courts …, with consequent beneficial effects for the 
legal protection of aliens [because of] a wider incorporation of international standards into municipal law”). 
241 On subsidiarity, see, Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 6–7. On its application to investment law, see generally, René Urueña, Subsidiary 
and the. Public–Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 99-
100 (arguing that “the demand for subsidiarity [in ISDS] is a function of the public–private divide in investment law,” 
with those focusing on the private nature of investment arbitration paying less heed to subsidiarity). 
242 See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND 
PROPORTIONALITY (2012); Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 545 (2014). 
243 See Thomas Kleinlein, Consensus and Contestability: The ECtHR and the Combined Potential of European 
Consensus and Procedural Rationality Control, 28:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 871, 872 (2017). 
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resolves the dispute between the parties. The national court decides all factual issues and it applies 
international law (as clarified by the international court) to the facts of the case. 
The EU uses such an approach for EU law, which is part of the national law of EU Member 
States. National courts may (and courts of final review must) ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling 
whenever a question of EU law is raised unless the CJEU has already pronounced on an identical 
matter or there is no reasonable doubt about the appropriate interpretation.244 The EU backs this 
system with a parallel procedure pursuant to which Member States or the European Commission 
can challenge a State’s failure to comply with EU law.245 
 
Other Variants of Complementarity 
 
The complementarity mechanisms described above could be tailored to the investment 
context. For example, a treaty could require the use of local remedies for a significant period of 
time before international adjudication can be triggered—such as the five-year period prescribed in 
India’s new model BIT246—and an arbitral tribunal could be granted the discretion to extend this 
period where appropriate. An investment treaty also could grant private parties the right, following 
the exhaustion of local remedies, to petition an international commission that is empowered to 
bring investment claims on their behalf before an international court. The American Convention 
on Human Rights, which contains a right to “property,” includes such a mechanism.247 
Other variants could build on domestic federal jurisdictions and private international law. 
For example, an international tribunal could refer a question of domestic law that arises in an 
investment dispute to a domestic court. Some jurisdictions, such as the United States, use an 
analogous mechanism whereby a federal court abstains from deciding a matter where state law is 
unclear until it is clarified by a state court, or refers the question to the state’s highest court (a 
procedure known as “certification”).248 Many well-known investment disputes illustrate how this 
procedure could be useful. For example, in his dissent in Bilcon v. Canada, Donald McRae found 
that the tribunal decided an issue under Canadian law that should have been decided by Canadian 
                                                 
244 Although a referral to the CJEU may be requested by one of the parties involved in the dispute, the decision to do 
so rests with the national court. The request stays national proceedings until the CJEU issues its ruling. The ruling has 
the force of res judicata, and its clarification of the law is binding on all national courts in the European Union. See 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 34, May 9, 2008, O.J. (C 115) 47, 
Art. 267, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uriCElex:12012E/TXT, and DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH 
DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 188 (3d ed., 2014). In practice, lower EU 
courts have made the bulk of preliminary references. See KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF 
EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 49-51 (2001). 
245 Chalmers et al., supra note 247, at 337-77. 
246 Model Indian BIT, supra note 51 at Art. 14(2)(ii). 
247 Private parties may petition the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which can refer their case to the 
court. The court also may issue advisory opinions in response to requests from Member States or the commission 
regarding the interpretation of the convention, including whether domestic laws and proposed domestic legislation are 
compatible with the convention. Article 21.2 of the Convention provides for the protection of property rights. See C 
Grossman, The Inter-American System and its Evolution, 2 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 49 (2010). See e.g. 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, 2007 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, at para. 
127 (stating “the Court has previously held that … a State may restrict the use and enjoyment of the right to property 
where the restrictions are: a) previously established by law; b) necessary; c) proportional, and d) with the aim of 
achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society”). 
248 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 831–35, 860–62 (7th ed. 2016) (discussing abstention and 
certification). 
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courts.249 A similar issue arose in the Metalclad case, which involved the power of local Mexican 
authorities under the Mexican constitution.250 In private international law, national courts also can 
stay proceedings out of international comity while another court decides the issues, basing their 
decisions on such factors as respect for the acts of foreign courts, fairness to disputants, and 
efficiency.251 
Finally, one can imagine less formal means that facilitate the use of domestic dispute 
settlement in the first instance. NAFTA gives investors up to three years to trigger arbitration, and 
thus investors may pursue local remedies until that time.252 CETA goes further. Like NAFTA, it 
establishes a three-year statute of limitations if no domestic remedies are pursued. However, if 
domestic remedies are pursued, then the investor has two years to commence arbitration after they 
are completed, subject to a maximum of ten years from the initial measure.253 In each case, once 
an investor initiates arbitration, it may no longer bring or continue its claims for damages before a 
domestic administrative tribunal or court. In this way, investors are granted time to resolve matters 
within domestic legal systems without pressure to trigger ISDS. There is some evidence that this 
mechanism may lead to more reliance on domestic courts than fork-in-the-road provisions under 
which an investor must exclusively use either local remedies or ISDS.254  
 
Trade-offs of Complementarity Mechanisms 
 
The above examples of complementarity operate in different ways, but they uncover 
common lessons. Most importantly, complementarity mechanisms prioritize the enhancement of 
the rule of law within domestic jurisdictions. They recognize domestic authorities as the primary 
guardians of achieving the rule of law and fairness toward investors and other constituencies, but 
subject to an international accountability mechanism. In the process, they can enhance legal 
certainty and uniform application of the law. By empowering domestic courts to oversee 
compliance with legal obligations (which directly or indirectly reflect international law ones), 
                                                 
249 Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov't of Can., Case No. 2009-04, 9 51 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) (McRae, dissenting), 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/Dissenting%200pinion%20of%20Professor%20Donald%20McRae956b.pdf?fil-id=2905  
paras 2 & 42 (maintaining that “it applies the standard in a way that it is met simply by an allegation of Canadian 
law,” and finding that “[t]hey could have taken the matter to the Federal Court of Canada, which could have reviewed 
the decision and perhaps overturned it”). 
250 Metalclad supra note 119 paras 105-106 (basing its decision on its finding that “the Municipality acted outside its 
authority” because “the exclusive authority for siting and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides with the 
Mexican federal government”—i.e. an issue of Mexican law that, in fact, was in dispute). 
251 See e.g., Royal and Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Canada v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88 (2d. Cir. 2006). Cf. 
European Union Regulation No. 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), art 29 (creating a first-in-time rule except where the parties otherwise have 
stipulated a court that has jurisdiction). For a general discussion on the complex relationship between domestic courts 
and ISDS, see, Christopher Schreuer, Interactions of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law 
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (A. W. 
Rovine ed.) 71 (2011). 
252 NAFTA, supra note 226, at art. 1121.  
253 CETA, supra note 47 at art. 8.19.6. 
254 For discussion, see, Sergio Puig, Investor-State Tribunals and Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners 
Saga, 5 MEXICAN L. REV. 239 (2013) (noting use of Mexican courts under the NAFTA model, known as known as a 
“no-U-turn” (or waiver) model. 
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complementarity mechanisms can broaden international law’s reach.255 There is some (at least 
preliminary) empirical evidence that they do so better than the alternative of using international 
tribunals as substitutes.256 These mechanisms can provide better assurance to all investors—large 
and small, foreign and domestic—thus reducing the cost of investment capital within the State. If 
the processes avoid significantly greater delay than the ISDS or proposed international court 
system—for instance, through tight standardized schedules (as under the WTO)—they should 
provide assurance for foreign investors. In addition, because complementarity mechanisms trigger 
interaction between national and international bodies, they can facilitate greater congruence 
between international and national norms.257 As a result, States may be less inclined to politicize 
a conflict. 
There are nonetheless potential disadvantages with this alternative. Some argue that there 
is a level of expertise lost through the application of international law by domestic judges with 
general jurisdiction.258 Others contend that empowering domestic adjudicatory processes to apply 
international law will catalyze new judicial politics domestically.259 Increased interaction could 
lead to politicization and friction between international and domestic courts as well, especially if 
an international tribunal were to expressly overrule a domestic legal system’s highest court.260 
Complementarity mechanisms—depending on their design—also could create significant delay 
and increase the cost of dispute settlement.261 If so, this could prejudice investors, which could be 
deterred from investing.262 
From the vantage of comparative institutional analysis, the potential complexity, delay, 
and increased cost of complementarity mechanisms create a risk of minoritarian bias, since large 
                                                 
255 Van Aaken, supra note 199 at 754 (arguing that “[I[f investment law is a kind of international administrative law, 
a harmonious combination and an alignment of the internationalized system of state liability and the national systems 
seems desirable”); Dodge, supra note  […] at 5–8 (favoring the exhaustion of local remedies). See also Richard C. 
Chen, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic Institutional Reform, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 547 (2017). 
256 See Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment 
for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORG. 1, 5 (2011) (providing empirical evidence that that international 
dispute settlement mechanisms have more impact when they complement an existing set of effective domestic 
institutions); and Ginsburg, supra note 186 at 119 (providing empirical evidence that ISDS may “reduce courts’ 
incentives to improve performance by depriving key actors from a need to invest in institutional improvement”). 
257 Tom Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute 
Resolution, 45 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004) (“First, adjudicative expression may construct focal points that 
clarify ambiguities in the convention. Second, adjudicative expression may provide signals that cause parties to update 
their beliefs about the facts that determine how the convention applies”); RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE 
POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015).  
258 August Reinisch, The International Relations of National Courts: A Discourse on International Law Norms on 
Jurisdictional and Enforcement Immunity, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER 
NEUHOLD 289, 307 (Reinisch, August & Kriebaum, Ursula eds., 2007) 
259 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 440-3 (1998) 
(questioning whether domestic courts should play an active role in enforcing international commitments in light of 
the opaque nature of the treaty-making process, and the vagueness of many of the treaty provisions that pose federalism 
issues). 
260 Apparently, this was a reason why the European Commission, in the end, did not require exhaustion of local 
remedies in its proposal for a multilateral investment court system. Interview with official of the European 
Commission, Brussels, May 16, 2018. 
261 Cf. Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?, 4 GLOBAL ARB. REV., no. 5, 2009 (reporting 
that the average length of an ICSID arbitration is 3.6 years); and BONNITCHA ET AL, supra note 88 at ch. 3 (finding 
that “this is more than twice the duration for litigation in domestic courts in selected developed countries”). 
262 Christoph H. Schreuer, Do We Need Investment Arbitration?, 11 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 10 (2014) (arguing 
that “the primary victims of [increase of cost and time] would be small and medium sized investors”). 
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investors with large stakes are better positioned than others to use such mechanisms. In addition, 
because investors no longer would have direct access to an international body, some could 
relinquish justified claims because of the increased costs, and thus local majoritarian bias would 
not be countered. 
The key disadvantage of these mechanisms is that their effectiveness depends on the good 
faith of national courts. Reference procedures, for example, depend on whether national courts 
refer questions to the international body, since such referrals may not be under the parties’ control. 
If national courts are not independent of the government, then references may not occur. 
Exhaustion of local remedies rules function only when domestic courts provide real access to 
justice, as opposed to endless delay in favor of the State. Without some level of trust in national 
courts, complementarity mechanisms could play into the hands of States that use the prospect of 
endless delay to extract concessions from aggrieved investors. 
Nonetheless, complementarity mechanisms facilitate the ability of all stakeholders to 
advance claims and counterclaims regarding an investment dispute because they prioritize the use 
of domestic mechanisms. They thus can be less one-sided and asymmetric than international 
adjudicatory mechanism such as ISDS or a multilateral investment court system used as 
substitutes. In this way, they can better protect against potential minoritarian bias in favor of high-
stakes investors, which is a common criticism of ISDS. As counter-majoritarian institutions, 
domestic courts can also check majoritarian biases in domestic decision-making, while being better 
situated to account for domestic local contexts. 
As previously discussed, domestic courts can also be subject to bias. In the case of 
complementarity mechanisms, however, these biases can be checked. An international tribunal is 
held in reserve to help support and assure that domestic processes function as intended. In this 
way, complementarity mechanisms can address the relative deficiencies of relying solely on 
domestic mechanisms or, alternatively, solely on international adjudicatory processes. 
In the end, the effectiveness of complementarity mechanisms depends on the existence of 
some level of judicial independence and impartiality in the domestic jurisdiction, combined with 
some level of trust across the domestic/international divide. Where these conditions are present, 
complementarity mechanisms can be both fair and effective. Moreover, they can work dynamically 
to enhance rule-of-law protections over time. Where these conditions are lacking, then 
complementarity mechanisms could be dysfunctional or at least increase the cost of dispute 
settlement. As in all cases, the imperfections of these complementary options must be weighed 
against those of other institutional alternatives. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
While institutional choice is always contextual and thus always difficult, comparative 
institutional analysis is essential because all institutional options are imperfect and subject to trade-
offs. Market options may not be available in many situations, especially for small- and medium-
sized investors. Domestic mechanisms may not be independent or impartial, lacking basic rule-of-
law protections. Diplomacy tends to favor powerful States, as well as influential firms that lobby 
them. Interstate dispute settlement can politicize disputes and still be tilted in favor of powerful 
actors, whether they be States or large corporations that have privileged access to State officials. 
For these reasons, many States turned to what is now the most frequently used 
mechanism—ISDS—but it too has many deficiencies. The system of appointment of arbitrators 
creates perverse incentives; there is no appeal mechanism to provide for consistency and a check 
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on poor decisions; and inconsistent decisions made by ad hoc tribunals limit the law’s expressive 
value. A multilateral investment court system seems better on many counts. Yet it also is remote 
from domestic publics and its decisions could be resisted on sovereignty grounds. 
In sum, it is difficult to decide in the abstract which institutional option is preferable. The 
primary goal, in our view, should be supporting the domestic rule of law. Thus, we highlight the 
importance of complementarity as an institutional option, an attribute that neither the current ISDS 
system nor the proposed multilateral investment court system prioritizes, although they could be 
adapted to do so, including through the current UNCITRAL reform process. From this perspective, 
national courts should be the first-line actors for resolving disputes, and other institutional 
mechanisms should provide incentives for enhancing the rule-of-law. 
Contexts differ across States, and choices should depend on those contexts. Where basic 
rule-of-law norms are protected, then the costs of an additional international system of review may 
not be worthwhile. Rather, reliance may be better placed on national courts, backed by market 
mechanisms. Where a State, in contrast, lacks independent, impartial, quality courts, an 
international mechanism that provides for investor standing to bring claims is of much greater 
importance. In some contexts, States may prefer not to include a system of exhaustion of local 
remedies so as to streamline the process. A State can then provide greater assurance to investors. 
In this context, a permanent court with an appellate mechanism appears to be a superior model to 
ISDS because it would more likely be attentive to a State’s public policy interests, and it would 
provide for greater consistency and coherence across decisions.  
Including national courts in decision-making offers advantages for building the domestic 
rule of law dynamically over time. For transitional States, ones where courts are developing in 
their professionalism and independence, a system of complementarity seems more appropriate. 
When rule-of-law norms are advanced through international law and become embedded in 
domestic governance, they can contribute to the creation of a broader “rule-of-law” transnational 
legal order.263 
We do not claim to have found an institutional option that is best across all contexts or 
through time. Adopting a legal realist perspective,264 the primary goal of this Article is to present 
and apply an analytic framework that helps to clarify the trade-offs of different institutional options 
for international investment law. The option chosen will be a function of context involving 
particular factors, such as a State’s capital endowment, market size, ideology, institutional 
development, and historical legacy.265 The tailoring of institutional choice can be met by what 
Anthea Roberts describes as ongoing pluralism and flexibility in the architecture of institutional 
mechanisms.266 Looking forward, our analysis reveals that the international investment regime 
should not simply rely on ISDS. Nor should it be replaced with a multilateral investment court 
system that applies to all countries unless such system provides for significant flexibility, such as 
through opt out and opt in provisions.267 Maintaining flexibility will likely be key, a flexibility that 
                                                 
263 See Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in TERENCE HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (2015).  
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permits States facing different challenges to select from a menu of imperfect international 
alternatives in light of their trade-offs. That flexibility should include experimentation with 
different complementarity mechanisms. 
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